International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial Space Activity by Trimble, James J.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 3 Article 4
3-15-1984
International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on
Commercial Space Activity
James J. Trimble
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
James J. Trimble International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on Commercial Space Activity, 11 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1984)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/4
The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect
on Commercial Space Activity
The United Nations, through a series of five treaties, has created a body
of international space law which controls the activities in space of states,
international organizations, and private interests. Corporations planning
an investment in commercial space ventures must consider the restrictions
and obligations which space law will impose on their activities. This arti-
cle discusses the substantive principles of the law of outer space and fo-
cuses on those provisions which will affect commercial space activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the
first satellite to orbit Earth. This achievement marked the open-
ing of a new territory, full of vast resources and exciting opportu-
nities. Advancements in technology have increased access to
outer space and its resources, but "to fully benefit from these new
opportunities, the need invariably [arose] for a body of Interna-
tional Law describing the ground rules for their use."'
. Within a year after the Sputnik launch, both the Soviet Union
and the United States called upon the United Nations to adopt
proposals aimed at inducing international cooperation in outer
space. It was hoped that such proposals would address the legal
problems arising from national space programs. 2 In a spirit of
mutual cooperation, space would be explored and exploited, not
for the good of only one nation, but for the benefit of all
humanity.3
1. VON BRAUN, Conclusions to the Development of the Law of Outer Space, in
SPACE LAW PERSPECTIVES 301, 301 (M. Schwartz ed. 1976). Commentators contend
that despite even the most sophisticated technology, humanity will never be able
to survive in outer space without rules of law. See Menter, The Impact of Treaties
on Commercial Space Operations, 1 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Impact of Treaties]; Menter, STS-Legal Connotations, 13
AKRON L. REV. 629, 631 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STS] (quoting Ambassador Ar-
thur Goldberg, the United States' permanent representative to the United
Nations).
2. See STS, supra note 1, at 631-32, for a sample of the many problems cre-
ated by space transportation. See also Vereshchetin, International Space Law
and Domestic Law: Problems of Interrelations, 9 J. SPACE L 31, 35 (1981) (address-
ing problems involving jurisdiction).
3. Some commentators believe that the act of creating international space
law has gone beyond the mere adoption of a set of rules. In creating this body of
Due in part to their expense and risks, space programs were
first established by governmental organizations.4 Presently, the
United States civil space efforts are carried out by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a government
agency.5 For example, NASA is currently involved in the develop-
ment and operation of the Space Shuttle program.6 The Space
Shuttle, and the increased feasibility of manufacturing in space
which the Shuttle provides, has generated interest within the pri-
vate sector concerning the future role of private enterprise in the
development and use of outer space and its resources. 7
The international law of outer space will affect corporations and
other non-governmental entities as they increase their role in
space activities.8 Space law grants certain rights to private enter-
prise, 9 while also placing limits upon space activities.10 The na-
ture of these rights and the extent of the limitations may
determine whether a given space venture, although technically
feasible, will be profitable. Thus, it is vitally important that pri-
law, "[h] uman spirits have been enlarged and liberated by a greater awareness of
mankind's full potential." C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE Xi (1982).
4. Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, The Future Legal Status of Nongovern-
mental Entities in Outer Space: Private Individuals and Companies as Subjects
and Beneficiaries of International Space Law, 5 J. SPACE L 125, 125 (1977). The
exploration of space was first undertaken by governments due to the tremendous
amount of financial resources and the sophisticated technology required. This is a
reversal of the pattern of early land-based exploration where private groups such
as the Hudson Bay Company conducted the initial expeditions. Id.
5. NASA was created by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
(NASAct), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2484 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Space efforts dealing with
weapons systems, military operations, or defense are reserved to the Department
of Defense, subject to the direction of the President. 42 U.S.C. § 2451(b) (1976).
6. See infra note 21 for information respecting the Space Shuttle.
7. See generally DeSaussure, The New Era in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV.
593 (1980) (discussion of the transformation of outer space resulting from use of
the Space Shuttle).
8. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of future
space activities which may be carried out by private enterprise.
9. Private enterprise has always been expected to participate in the use and
exploitation of outer space. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 831; Menter, Legal
Regime of International Space Flight, in SPACE SHUFFLE AND THE LAw 61, 61 (S.
Gorove ed. 1980) ("It is thus apparent that the 1967 Treaty envisions activities in
space by private enterprise"). For a discussion of the Soviet Union's attempt to
exclude private enterprise from outer space, and the United States' response, see
Dula, Management of Interparty and Third-Party Liability for Routine Space Shut-
tle Operations, in SPACE SsurrrLE AND THE LAW 93, 95 (S. Gorove ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as Management 1; Dula, Regulation of Private Commercial Space
Activities, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 156, 172 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Regulation]. See
also Jaksetic, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views, 28 Am. U.L. REV. 483
(1979) (a discussion of the Soviet Union's views on space law in general).
10. Many of these limits are not yet clearly defined. See, e.g., Management,
supra note 9, at 102-03.
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vate enterprise have an understanding of international space law
and its effects on commercial space activities.
Following a brief discussion of the space activities which pri-
vate enterprise might undertake, this comment will examine the
development of the substantive principles of space law. Next, the
impact of space law upon private investment in outer space will
be addressed.
II. ACTIVITY BY PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN OUTER SPACE
A. Current Activities
. Satellites are currently the predominant commercial activity in
outer space." These satellites are used primarily in telecommu-
nications, but they are also used for navigation, remote sensing of
Earth's resources, and meteorology.' 2 "Spin-offs"13 from technol-
ogy developed in the course of NASA's space programs have
proven to be another successful commercial benefit linked to
outer space. These spin-off products have been particularly im-
portant in the area of medical technology, but have had an impact
in many other industries such as communication and travel.14
11. Tennen, Outer Space: A Preserve for All Humankind, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L.
145, 146 (1979). The first operational commercial satellite was launched on April 6,
1965, by the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). Corporations
such as RCA and Western Union have launched their own satellites. Revenues
from the use of these satellites exceed $1 billion per year. Id. at 147.
12. See id. at 146-47; Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, supra note 4, at 133-40.
Remote sensing satellites have been of particular help in the areas of agriculture
and marine resources, oil and gas exploration, forestry, land use and geology, car-
tography, hydrology, and pollution detection. Id. at 137-39. At present, the remote
sensing program operated by the United States, Landsat, is not controlled by the
private sector, but rather is supervised by NASA. There is a possibility that Land-
sat, along with this country's meteorological satellite systems, will soon be turned
over to the private sector. Pikus, Law and Security in Outer Space: Private Sector
Interests, 11 J. SPACE L. 111, 112 (1983).
13. "Spin-offs" are products and processes that emerge from secondary appli-
cation of technology NASA develops for its space programs. Tennen, supra note
11, at 146.
14. See Robinson, Legal Problems of Sustaining Manned-Space Flights, Space
Stations and Lunar Communities Through Private Initiative and Non-Public
Funding, 7 INT'L LAW. 455, 455 n.2 (1973).
See also NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, SPINOFF 1982
(1982) which discusses NASA's major aeronautical and space programs and ways
in which technology originally developed for NASA is being adapted for use by
private firms. This report is published annually by NASA's Office of External Re-
lations, Technology Utilization and Industrial Affairs Division. Examples of "spin-
off" products include: airline wheelchairs, wind turbine blades, sportswear with
B. Future Activities
Commercial satellites will continue to play a large part in pri-
vate space ventures, but government and industry are beginning
to think of space as an attractive location for manufacturing.15
The lack of gravity in space will allow a company to manufacture
certain products in increased quantities and at greater levels of
quality, all at a lower price than could be achieved on Earth.16
Many research programs are already under way in areas ranging
from electronics to pharmaceuticals in an effort to discover items
that can be manufactured in outer space on a cost-effective ba-
sis.17 Construction of solar power satellites, communications plat-
forms, 18 and mining facilities on the Moon or other celestial
bodies' 9 are further examples of possible future commercial
space ventures.
Some manufacturing processes have already been tested on
Space Shuttle flights and private companies are seriously contem-
plating the first steps towards building factories in outer space.20
special cooling systems, advanced welding tools, computer programs, a human tis-
sue stimulator, and fire resistant materials. Id.
15. See Fuqua, Space Industrialization: Some Legal and Policy Considerations
for Private Enterprise, 8 J. SPACE L. 1, 2-3 (1980) ("Private enterprise interest in
space will center around goods and services for use on earth which can be pro-
duced either uniquely in space or better in space than on earth").
16. See Smith, Lopatkiewicz & Rothblatt, Legal Implications of a Permanent
Manned Presence in Space, 85 W. VA. L. REv. 857, 858 (1983).
17. See ManagemenA supra note 9, at 94 (discussing semiconductor crystals
and pharmaceuticals); Tennen, supra note 11, at 147 (manufacture of ball bear-
ings, pharmaceuticals, optical components, metal foams, and novel alloys not cost-
effective or possible in gravity); Impact of Treaties, supra note 1, at 390 (electronic
materials, biological preparations, glass and ceramics, physical processes in fluids,
and metallurgical, chemical, and electrochemical processes).
18. See 1979 Annual Meeting: Space Commerce and the Space Shuttle, Its De-
velopment: Lega Scientific and Practical Implications, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 73, 76
(1980) (summary of paper delivered by Dr. Christopher Kraft, Director, Lyndon B.
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas) [hereinafter cited as Space Commerce].
19. See Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, supra note 4, at 139-40.
20. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics and the Ortho Pharmaceuticals Division
of Johnson & Johnson are interested in establishing a space facility to manufac-
ture a wide assortment of pharmaceuticals through a process called electrophore-
sis. This process was successfully tested on the fourth American Space Shuttle
flight. Smith, Lopatkiewicz & Rothblatt, supra note 16, at 858-59. International Sat-
ellite Industries, Inc., was incorporated in Delaware on August 3, 1978, for the pur-
pose of furthering the construction of solar power satellites. Tennen, supra note
11, at 148.
Private commercial ventures in space should benefit from President Reagan's
recent proposal to construct a permanently manned space station within a decade.
President's State of the Union Address, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87, 90-91
(Jan. 25, 1984). In a national radio address three days after his State of the Union
address, the President discussed the role of private enterprise in America's space
strategy:
The third goal of our space strategy will be to encourage American in-
dustry to move quickly and decisively into space. Obstacles to private sec-
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The successful operation of the Space Shuttle is a key part in any
space manufacturing plans,21 and if the Shuttle program contin-
ues at its present rate of development, the era of full-scale manu-
facturing may be realized in the very near future.2 2
tor space activities will be removed, and we'll take appropriate steps to
spur private enterprise in space.
We expect space-related investments to grow quickly in future years,
creating many new jobs and greater prosperity for all Americans. Compa-
nies interested in putting payloads into space, for example, should have
ready access to private sector launch services.
Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole will work to stimulate the pri-
vate sector investment in commercial, unmanned space boosters. We
need a thriving, commercial launch industry. NASA, along with other de-
partments and agencies, will be taking a number of initiatives to promote
private sector investment to ensure our lead over current and potential
foreign competitors. So, we're going to bring into play America's greatest
asset-the vitality of our free enterprise system.
20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 113, 113-14 (Jan. 28, 1984).
"By constructing and launching the facility, along with several unmanned plat-
forms, the government increases the predictability associated with investing in an
otherwise risky area. Private industry will have a safe, reliable habitat in space-
created and maintained by the resources of the entire nation." Meslin & Lippy,
Should We Construct a Space Station? Yes, Its Potential is Vast, LA. Times, Feb.
1, 1984, Part II, at 5, col. 3 (the authors specialize in analyzing commercial and in-
dustrial opportunities in space).
See generally Fuqua, supra note 15, at 4-6 (proposal for a Space Industrialization
Corporation to provide investment capital and establish the proper business cli-
mate so that industries will enter into space manufacturing); Smith, International
Utilization and Management of Space Systems, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L 113 (1979) (pro-
posal for development of space platforms with private sector participation in the
form of a "Space Industrialization Corporation"); Robinson, supra note 14, at 457-
58 (discussion of efforts by the Committee for the Future to undertake a lunar ex-
ploration program supported by private funding, noting that people around the
world are "convinced that a rational space research and exploration program is es-
sential to a positive and effective transition from dissipatory political, economic,
ideological, and technological parochialisms to a truly global awareness of Earth's
ecosphere and its inhabitants." Id. at 474).
21. For a discussion of the Space Shuttle program see NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 14, at 6. See also Good, Earth Space Trans-
port Systems-Concepts, Criteria & Constraints, 2 Hous. J. INr'L L 35 (1979) (dis-
cussion of the practical, commercial, and economic problems in the development
of a private sector Earth-space transport system, with a view that such a system
can and should be developed immediately); Smith, Current Issues Before Congress
Affecting Space Activities-Checklist and Summary, 10 J. SPACE L. 41, 50 (1982)
(The Space Transportation Co., a private corporation, has offered to purchase a
fifth shuttle orbiter which it will then give to NASA, or to whomever else operates
the Space Shuttle, in exchange for all marketing rights for non-government shuttle
users).
22. It has been predicted that "revenues from commercial operations in
[outer] space over the next 25 years will grow to tens of billions of dollars per
year." STS, supra note 1, at 645 (quoting Disher, Space Transportation, Satellite
Services and Space Platforms, ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS 42, 67 (1979)).
Some studies indicate that the number of jobs in the space industry will increase
Future commercial utilization of outer space by private enter-
prise, however, depends on a continued expansion of technology.
The law of outer space which will regulate the private sector's
space activities is equally important.23
III. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw
A. The Historical Development of International Space Law24
The United Nations, through its Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), is the primary source of interna-
tional law dealing with outer space. The first major United Na-
tions action directed toward establishing a body of law for outer
space came in the form of a resolution adopted on December 13,
1958.25 This resolution was important in two respects: first, it es-
tablished the direction of subsequent international agreements by
stressing international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer
space;26 and second, it created the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which later became COPUOS.27
The Committee was charged with investigating the legal and
political problems posed by the use of outer space and determin-
ing what role the United Nations should play in solving those
problems. A report was submitted on June 25, 1959, which set out
the major legal problems requiring further study. These
by 5 million by the year 2000, and tax revenues from all space industries will ap-
proach $50 billion annually. Meslin & Lippy, supra note 20. But see, Sandler &
Schulze, The Economics of Outer Space, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 371 (1981) (in an
economic analysis of various space activities, "club arrangement" satellite sys-
tems, financed by tolls charged to users, are presently the only feasible commer-
cial space activity).
23. "For the time being, law and science have marched forward together."
Finch, Outer Space Liability: Past, Present, and Future, 14 INT'L LAw. 123, 127
(1980).
24. The material in this section is taken from C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 12-
20, 61-88, 154-70, 217-34, 246-48, unless otherwise noted.
25. Resolution 1348 (XIII), reprinted in 4 MANUAL ON SPACE LAw 492 (N.
Jasentuliyana & R. Lee ed. 1981). See also Resolution 1148 (XII). This resolution
focused on disarmament in general, and thus is not strictly a resolution respecting
space law. Passed soon after the launch of Sputnik 1, this resolution expressed a
concern that objects sent into outer space be used "exclusively for peaceful and
scientific purposes." C. CHRiSTOL, supra note 3, at 13.
26. "Recognizing the common interest of mankind in outer space and recog-
nizing that it is the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful pur-
poses only.... ." Resolution 1348, supra note 25 (emphasis in original).
27. The Committee was composed of representatives from Argentina, Austra-
lia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab
Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Resolution 1472 (XIV), reprinted in 4 MANUAL ON SPACE Lw, supra note 25, at
492, made the ad hoc committee a permanent body of the General Assembly.
Membership in COPUOS has been increased to 53 members. See C. CHRISTOL,
supra note 3, at 915, for a list of members as of 1982.
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problems were in the following areas: (1) freedom of outer space
for exploration and use; (2) liability for damages caused by space
objects; (3) allocating radio frequencies; (4) avoiding interference
between aircraft and space vehicles; (5) registering and coordi-
nating space vehicle launches; and (6) reentry and landing of
space vehicles.
Since its inception, COPUOS has worked to find solutions to
these legal problems through the creation of international agree-
ments. 28 Five such agreements have been adopted by the United
Nations: (1) the 1967 Outer Space Treaty;29 (2) the Rescue and
Return Agreement of 1968;30 (3) the Liability Convention of 1973;31
28. COPUOS operates on a basis of consensus in negotiating agreements.
This means that no voting takes place, but instead a decision is made whenever
there is no objection by a member state. The Committee has operated with this
system since 1962 when it was chosen as a compromise between making decisions
based on a majority of votes or based on unanimity. The system has the advan-
tage of forcing the Committee members to work out a mutually acceptable agree-
ment without giving a single state the power to veto an agreement. If an objection
is raised to a particular section of a proposed agreement, the entire agreement is
not struck down, but rather, additional negotiations can take place concerning
only the portion in contention.
Since the final agreement is acceptable to all parties, there is a greater likeli-
hood that all members will comply with the agreed terms. The consensus proce-
dure has received a great deal of praise and has been called "one of the most
efficient and effective, if not widespread, means to develop international law." C.
CHRISTOi, supra note 3, at 18. But see Gorove, NGO's at UNISPACE 82: Session on
Legal and Political Aspects, Vienna, Aug. 19, 1982, 10 J. SPACE L. 198, 201 (1982)
(quoting Professor Krateros M. Ioannou for the argument that the consensus prin-
ciple is being endangered by third world countries who claim they are ignored in
COPUOS and, therefore, are attempting to bypass the Committee by taking reso-
lutions directly to .the United Nations General Assembly, where they hold the ma-
jority of seats).
For a more detailed discussion of the consensus principle and COPUOS, see
generally Galloway, Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE L. 3 (1979); Hosenball, The United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Past Accomplishments
and Future Challenges, 7 J. SPACE L. 95 (1979).
29. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened
for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, re-
printed in 2 UNITED STATES SPACE LAW II.A.2 (S. Gorove ed. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Outer Space Treaty]. Negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty began in 1962
following the presentation of draft principles by the Soviet Union. Subsequent
discussion and input from several countries led to proposed draft treaties in 1965
and the complete agreement in 1967.
30. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968;
19 U.S.T. 7570; T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, reprinted in 2 UNITED STATES
SPACE LAW, supra note 29, at II.A.3. [hereinafter cited as Rescue and Return
Agreement]. Debate on the Rescue and Return Agreement began in 1962 follow-
(4) the Registration Convention of 1976;32 and (5) the Moon
Treaty of 1979.33 The United States is a party to all of these agree-
ments except the Moon Treaty, which is the only agreement not
yet ratified by the required number of nations.34
The Outer Space Treaty is the "main base for the legal order of
the space environment."35 All subsequent international agree-
ments concerning outer space are to a great extent simply amplifi-
cations and clarifications of the principles set forth in the Outer
Space Treaty.
The United Nations, through these various international agree-
ments, has developed a broad body of international space law
which reaches states, international organizations, and private in-
terests.36 The future commercial exploration, use, and exploita-
ing proposals by the United States and the Soviet Union, the only countries then
engaged in manned space programs. A final agreement was not reached until 1968,
principally due to the Committee's focus on completion of the Outer Space Treaty.
The substance of the Rescue and Return Agreement is discussed infra in text ac-
companying notes 63-75.
31. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2399, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, reprinted in 2 UNrED STATES
SPACE LAW, supra note 29, at II.A.4. [hereinafter cited as Liability Convention].
The Liability Convention was first discussed in 1962 as a result of a proposal by
the United States. Consensus on basic principles of international responsibility
was quickly achieved, but implementation of the principles in the form of an inter-
national agreement was not achieved until 1972. The area of responsibility for
damages is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 84-109.
32. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, reprinted in 2 UNITED
STATES SPACE LAw, supra note 29, at II.A.5 [hereinafter cited as Registration Con-
vention]. Registration of space objects was assumed in the Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 29, art. VII, but disparity in the nature and amount of information
made available concerning space objects prompted the drafting of the Registration
Convention. France made the first proposal in 1968 and consensus on a final
agreement was eventually achieved in 1975. Details of the Registration Conven-
tion are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 112-15.
33. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434, reprinted in 2
UNITED STATES SPACE LAw, supra note 29, at II.A.7 [hereinafter cited as Moon
Treaty]. The Outer Space Treaty applies to the Moon as well as to outer space,
but the Apollo Moon landings beginning in 1969 sparked a demand for guidelines
covering exploitation of lunar and celestial resources. Argentina submitted the
first proposal in 1970 and a final draft of the Moon Treaty was approved by
COPUOS nine years later. The Moon Treaty is discussed infra in text accompany-
ing notes 135-63.
34. The Moon Treaty has been signed by eleven nations and ratified by two
others. Five ratifications are necessary for the agreement to enter into force. The
Soviet Union is one nation that has not yet signed the Moon Treaty. See infra text
accompanying notes 135-63 for discussion of the Moon Treaty and why it has not
been adopted. For a list of the current status of ratifications of the five United Na-
tions space treaties, see C. CHIMSTOL, supra note 3, at 908-12.
35. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 20.
36. The international law of outer space is not limited to the treaties drafted
by COPUOS, although they do constitute the largest and most important part of
international space law. Other sources of space law include general international
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tion of space by the private sector will be greatly affected by this
law of outer space, and by future international agreements. 37
B. The Basic Principles of International Space Law38
1. Freedom of exploration, use, and scientific investigation in
outer space.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that all nations
are equally free to explore and use outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, and that such exploration and
use shall be conducted to benefit all countries, and shall be the
province of all humanity.39 This freedom creates certain rights for
law, the United Nations charter, other United Nations treaties, private agreements
between government organizations such as those between NASA and the Euro-
pean Space Administration (ESA), and the rules and regulations relating to radio
frequencies promulgated by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).
See Galloway, supra note 28, at 9.
37. COPUOS presently has three primary items on its agenda. These are dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 168-214.
38. The principles of space law rely on a basic underlying philosophy that is
expressed in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty:
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result
of man's entry into outer space,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried
on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their
economic or scientific development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the
scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of
mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations
between States and peoples ....
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, preamble. See also Gorove, Session on "Outer
Space, International Law, International Regimes and the Common Heritage of
Mankind", 10 J. SPACE L. 41, 65 (1982) (quoting a speech by Edward R. Finch, Jr.)
(includes a list of additional principles affecting the law of outer space).
The legal principles established by the space treaties are binding only upon
states which ratify the agreement. In the following discussion, "state" refers to a
nation which is a party to the treaty, unless otherwise indicated. See infra note 47
for discussion of when these principles might be binding on all nations.
39. The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of
all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment, and shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind,
on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there
shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, includ-
countries, while also imposing certain obligations upon them.
Every state has the right to explore and use outer space, the
Moon, and other celestial bodies. The negotiations involved in
drafting the treaty indicate that the language of Article I encom-
passes not only the space environment, but also the natural re-
sources located in that spatial area.4o The word "use" has been
interpreted to mean "exploitation" on a non-exclusive basis.
Thus, all countries have an equal right to exploit the resources of
space, subject to other provisions of the treaty.4 1
Access to space can not be denied to any state. This provision,
however, does not create a right of "innocent passage" through
the airspace of another country to reach outer space. Some au-
thorities, however, contend that a customary international right of
free passage has developed. This right of passage has resulted
from the current practice of states failing to seek permission to
pass through foreign airspace en route to orbit, coupled with the
lack of protest from countries whose airspace has been previously
violated by space-bound objects.42
The requirement that all exploration and use be carried out for
the benefit of all countries is a general provision intending only to
"serve as a guide for space powers in developing their programs
and conducting their activities in space." 43 Thus, a state or pri-
vate entity would not be required to relinquish its intellectual
property rights or profits from space ventures.44
A further limitation on the freedom to explore and use space is
the expression that such activity will be "the province of all man-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and en-
courage international co-operation in such investigation.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. I.
40. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 39.
41. Id. at 39-42.
42. See Regulation, supra note 9, at 183-84 Lachs, Some Reflections on the
State of the Law of Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 3, 8 (1981) (this customary route
would be limited to objects en route to outer space to "explore it and use it in a
lawful way").
43. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 42-43 (quoting a legal opinion prepared for
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Department of
State). See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
44. Hoover, Law and Security in Outer Space from the Viewpoint of Private
Industry, 11 J. SPACE L. 115, 122-24 (1983).
When the U.S. Senate ratified the Outer Space Treaty it attached an under-
standing setting forth its interpretation of Article I, paragraph 1. It states:
"[N]othing in Article I, paragraph 1 of the treaty diminishes or alters the right of
the United States to determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space
activities." C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 43, (quoting SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATiONS, TREATY ON OUTER SPACE, S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1967)). The understanding has the effect of limiting the legal obligations of the
United States to the interpretation of the treaty adopted by the Senate.
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kind."45 This is the first formal international agreement to in-
clude a provision demonstrating a concern for all humanity. This
principle is also a general provision intended to guide the devel-
opment of space in a productive and peaceful direction. The "all
mankind" condition also serves to unify other parts of the Outer
Space Treaty which attempts to provide a framework of interna-
tional cooperation and mutual enrichment from space activities. 46
Thus, one of the basic principles of international space law is the
universal freedom to explore and use outer space, guided by a
concern for all people.4 7
2. Nonappropriation of Outer Space.
Article IE of the Outer Space Treaty states that outer space, in-
cluding the Moon and other celestial bodies, may not be appropri-
ated by any nation.4 8 Thus, no part of the space environment may
be placed under the exclusive control of any nation. Taken in
conjunction with Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, this princi-
ple helps to maintain the freedom to explore and use all portions
of space, as well as the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Although the Treaty expressly forbids appropriation by "use or
occupation," this is not a ban on the construction of manned
45. C. CHRISTO1, supra note 3, at 44. For discussion of the impact of such a
provision on international law as a whole, see Cocca, The Advances in Interna-
tional Law Through the Law of Outer Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 13 (1981). See also
Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, supra note 4, at 155 (considering humanity to be
the "beneficiary" of international space law).
46. C. CRIUsToL, supra note 3, at 45-46 ("[Ilts function has been to unify and
promote the terms and goals of the . . . [Outer Space] Treaty").
47. The Outer Space Treaty has been ratified by 84 countries. Some commen-
tators believe the provisions for freedom of exploration and use would also apply
to non-signatory states. They argue that this principle is legally binding as interna-
tional customary law based on common usage and lack of opposition from states
not party to the agreement. See Diederiks-Verschoor, Space Law as It Effects Do-
mestic Law, 7 J. SPACE L. 39, 41 n.10 (1979); Galloway, Perspectives of Space Law,
9 J. SPACE L. 21, 28 (1981) ("[Tjhe practice of nations has been to abide by some
principles recognized as customary international space law"); Goedhuis, Some Re-
cent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of Interna-
tional Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 214-15 (1981). But see
Regulation, supra note 9, at 186-87 ("[T] here is not a widely accepted, codified and
agreed upon space law that applies to all countries." SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE AcTIVrrlEs OF
STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, Comm. Print. 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, 317 (May 1980) (emphasis in original)).
48. "Outer space, including. the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. 1.
space facilities.4 9 The building of a space station or lunar base
would not constitute an act of appropriation. Neither would the
removal of resources for manufacturing or other use violate Arti-
cle 11.50 Such a broad interpretation of Article II would render
meaningless the provision for the freedom to explore and use
space granted under Article I.
3. The activities of nations must be in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the
United Nations.
Activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, must be conducted in accord-
ance with international law. This principle is established by Arti-
cle III of the Outer Space Treaty with the intent of maintaining
peace and promoting cooperation among nations.5' By adopting
this provision, the drafters of the Treaty intended to provide for a
rule of law that would bring some order to activities occurring in
space. Application of the rules of international law to outer space
provides greater protection of the interests of "all mankind" as
declared in Article 1.52
4. Limits on the military use of outer space.
The military use of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial
bodies is limited by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.53 In
49. A study prepared by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
indicates that the Soviet Union is actively engaged in developing space stations
which will allow "permanent settlements off-planet." Current Soviet efforts are
centered in the Salyut Space Station Program which began twelve years ago. The
Salyut 7 space station now in orbit was recently manned for 150 days by two cos-
monauts. L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1983, Part I, at 1, col. 3.
50. See Gorove, The Space Shuttle and Some of Its Legal Implications, in
SPACE SHUTrLE AND THE LAw 1, 10 (S. Gorove ed. 1980); Impact of Treaties, supra
note 1, at 394.
51. States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in
accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Na-
tions, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and
promoting international co-operation and understanding.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. HI.
52. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 47-48. Some of the fundamental principles of
international law that would be incorporated by this Article are the "principle of
nonaggression, the principle of pacific settlement of disputes,. . . the principle of
prohibition of war propoganda and ... the principle of disarmament." Diederiks-
Verschoor, supra note 47, at 42.
53. States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or sta-
tion such weapons in outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of mil-
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early discussions of principles for outer space, the belief was com-
monly held that the entire realm of outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, would be limited to use for
strictly peaceful purposes. The restrictions of Article IV, how-
ever, are not so encompassing, but place only certain limitations
on military activities in outer space. This is largely the result of
positions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union during
treaty negotiations.54
Article IV, paragraph 1, applies to the totality of the space envi-
ronment, but prohibits only nuclear weapons and weapons of
mass destruction.55 The use of conventional weapons, or other
military activities, is not proscribed. Article IV, paragraph 2,
which applies to the Moon and other celestial bodies, states that
these areas are reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.56
Much discussion has been generated over the exact meaning of
"peaceful purposes." The United States has continually asserted
that peaceful purposes means non-aggressive uses of the space
environment.57 In addition, the United States has maintained the
right of any state to defend itself against foreign aggression.
Under the United States' position, the military would be free to
use the Moon and other celestial bodies, as long as the use was
non-aggressive and the restriction on the establishment of mili-
tary bases, the testing of weapons, and the conduct of maneuvers
was followed.58
The Soviet Union originally took the position that all military
activities are potentially aggressive and, therefore, not peaceful.5 9
itary bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weap-
ons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any
other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equip-
ment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. IV.
54. C. CHRSTOL, supra note 3, at 22-23.
55. See supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. "It is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only
for peaceful-that is, non-aggressive and beneficial-purposes." Cheng, The Legal
Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Defi-
nition of Peaceful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 99 (1983) (quoting Senator Gore of the
United States speaking to the First Committee of the United Nations on December
3, 1962).
58. C. CHRisTOL, supra note 3, at 29.
59. Id. at 27. "[TI he concept of the 'peaceful use' of outer space excludes any
In response, authorities argued that some military uses, such as
reconnaissance satellites, had a stabilizing effect by helping to
prevent surprise attacks and would thus ease world tensions.60
Whether this is true or not is subject to debate, but as a result of
such arguments and the realities of the world's political situation,
"peaceful purposes" is now generally interpreted to mean "non-
aggressive."61 Any application of this principle must ultimately
take into account the other basic principle of international space
law, specifically, the beneficial use of outer space for humanity
called for in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.62
5. The rescue and return of astronauts and space objects.
Article V of the Outer Space Treaty requires each nation to
render all possible assistance to astronauts in distress. 63 States
are further required to report any phenomena they discover
which might pose a threat to astronauts.6 Underlying this princi-
ple is a basic humanitarian desire to protect and save human
measures of a military nature." Zhukov, Practical Problems of Space Law, INT'L
AFF. (Moscow), May 1963, at 27-28 (quoted in C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 27).
60. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 28.
61. Id. at 27-30. Although the issue of what constitutes a peaceful purpose
seems to be settled, i.e., non-aggressive, there may be a weakness in the United
States' position. The United States has used military satellites as an example of a
military space activity that is non-aggressive. A satellite functions in outer space,
but the "peaceful purposes" restriction of Article IV, paragraph 2, does not apply
to outer space, only to the Moon and other celestial bodies. Thus, even if the mili-
tary satellite were aggressive, Article IV would not prohibit its use, unless it con-
tained a nuclear weapon or other weapon of mass destruction. The question of
what is a peaceful purpose when applied to some future activity on the Moon or
other celestial body will probably depend on the political climate existing at that
time. See also Cheng, supra note 57, at 99 (criticism of the United States'
position).
62. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. To some extent, the law of
outer space is a unique branch of international law due to its devotion to peaceful
purposes. Diederiks-Verschoor, supra note 47, at 39-41.
63. States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of man-
kind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the
event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of an-
other State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a land-
ing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of
their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astro-
nauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astro-
nauts of other States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States
Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health
of astronauts.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. V.
64. See supra note 63.
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lives.
6 5
The Rescue and Return Agreement of 1968 expands upon the
Outer Space Treaty, and provides a framework for implementa-
tion of these humanitarian concerns. Article 1 of the Agreement
requires a state which learns of personnel of a spacecraft having
suffered an accident, experiencing distress, or making an emer-
gency or unintended landing to notify the launching authority. 66
If a spacecraft has made an unintended landing, or a landing due
to accident, distress, or emergency, Article 2 imposes a duty upon
the country in which the landing occurred to rescue the personnel
of that spacecraft. That duty requires the taking of "all possible
steps" to effectuate the rescue and to provide all necessary assist-
ance. In some circumstances, the launching state may join with
the state of landing to carry out a more effective rescue attempt.67
When the personnel of a spacecraft land in an area outside the ju-
risdiction of any country, Article 3 requires any state which is in a
position to help to offer whatever assistance is necessary.6 8 Arti-
65. See, e.g., Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 30, preamble
("Prompted by sentiments of humanity").
66. Each Contracting Party which receives information or discovers that
the personnel of a spacecraft have suffered accident or are experiencing
conditions of distress or have made an emergency or unintended landing
in territory under its jurisdiction or on the high seas or in any other place
not under the jurisdiction of any State shall immediately:
(a) Notify the launching authority or, if it cannot identify and immedi-
ately communicate with the launching authority, immediately make a
public announcement by all appropriate means of communication at its
disposal;
(b) Notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should dis-
seminate the information without delay by all appropriate means of com-
munication at his disposal.
Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1.
67. If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the
personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Con-
tracting Party, it shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue them
and render them all necessary assistance.. . . If assistance by the launch-
ing authority would help to effect a prompt rescue or would contribute
substantially to the effectiveness of search and rescue operations, the
launching authority shall co-operate with the Contracting Party with a
view to the effective conduct of search and rescue operations. Such opera-
tions shall be subject to the direction and control of the Contracting Party,
which shall act in close and continuing consultation with the launching
authority.
Id. art. 2.
68. If information is received or it is discovered that the personnel of a
spacecraft have alighted on the high seas or on any other place not under
the jurisdiction of any State, those Contracting Parties which are in a po-
sition to do so shall, if necessary, extend assistance in search and rescue
operations for such personnel to assure their speedy rescue. They shall
cle 4 provides that personnel of a spacecraft shall be safely and
promptly returned to the launching authority.69 The return of
space objects or their component parts and payment for any ex-
penses incurred by the rescuing country are governed by Article
5.70
The provisions of the Rescue and Return Agreement extend
greater protection to space personnel than granted by Article V of
the Outer Space Treaty. The Agreement encompasses "personnel
of a spacecraft," not just astronauts. Thus, any crew member who
ventures into space will be protected by the Agreement. 71 The
Agreement also broadens the definition of types of incidents for
which aid must be given. The new area which is not listed in the
Outer Space Treaty is "unintended landings."7 2 Basically, this
covers any landing due to inadvertence or mistake made by the
personnel of the spacecraft or the organization which has control
inform the launching authority and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations of the steps they are taking and of their progress.
Id. art. 3.
69. If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the
personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Con-
tracting Party or have been found on the high seas or in any other place
not under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to representatives of the launching authority.
Id. art. 4.
70. 1. Each Contracting Party which receives information or discovers
that a space object or its component parts has returned to Earth in terri-
tory under its jurisdiction or on the high seas or in any other place not
under the jurisdiction of any State, shall notify the launching authority
and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Each Contracting Party having jurisdiction over the territory on
which a space object or its component parts has been discovered shall,
upon the request of the launching authority and with assistance from that
authority if requested, take such steps as it finds practicable to recover
the object or component parts.
3. Upon request of the launching authority, objects launched into outer
space or their component parts found beyond the territorial limits of the
launching authority shall be returned to or held at the disposal of repre-
sentatives of the launching authority, which shall, upon request, furnish
identifying data prior to their return.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, a Contracting
Party which has reason to believe that a space object or its component
parts discovered in territory under its jurisdiction, or recovered by it else-
where, is of a hazardous or deleterious nature may so notify the launching
authority, which shall immediately take effective steps, under the direc-
tion and control of the said Contracting Party, to eliminate possible dan-
ger of harm.
5. Expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a
space object or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this arti-
cle shall be borne by the launching authority.
Id. art. 5.
71. C. CHmsTo, supra note 3, at 183. Thus, civilian scientists or engineers
who conduct experiments during Space Shuttle flights will receive the same pro-
tection as the astronauts who pilot the Shuttle.
72. See supra note 66. Cf. supra note 63 (provisions of Outer Space Treaty).
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over it.73 The notice requirement of Article 174 is also an expan-
sion of the duty imposed on a state when faced with a situation
where personnel of a spacecraft need assistance.75 Finally, Article
5 of the Rescue and Return Agreement expands on a duty first
created in Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.76 By creating
clear guidelines concerning the return of space objects and their
component parts, the Agreement makes possible the implementa-
tion of the duty to return both personnel and equipment.
The Rescue and Return Agreement, as well as Article V of the
Outer Space Treaty, is important for many reasons, but its great-
est impact is found in the concrete and practical manner in which
it expresses a deep concern for humanity and the preservation of
life.
6. International responsiblity for national activities in outer
space.
The Outer Space Treaty imposes two types of responsibility on
states. First, Article VI requires that a state bear national respon-
sibility for all of its activities in space, whether carried out by gov-
ernmental agencies or non-governmental entities. The activities
of the non-governmental entity must be authorized and super-
vised by the state in order to assure compliance with interna-
tional law.7 7 Second, Article VII places international liability for
any damages caused by a space object or its component parts
73. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 183-84. The "most obvious example of an un-
intended landing ... is one caused by a navigational error, either by the astronaut
in the spacecraft, the controllers on Earth, or by automatic equipment." Dembling
& Arons, The Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 630, 646 (1968).
74. See supra note 66.
75. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 184-85.
76. See infra note 110.
77. States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies
or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities
are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.
When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for
compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international or-
ganization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such
organization.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. VI.
upon the initial launching state and the state from whose terri-
tory the object was actually launched. 78
The most important aspect of the national responsibility estab-
lished by Article VI is the inclusion of non-governmental agen-
cies.79 The effect of Article VI is to place obligations on states and
limitations upon private individuals within those states. The state
must establish some framework which will allow it to authorize
and supervise private space activities and assure that those activi-
ties are not in violation of international space law.80 The non-gov-
ernmental organization must follow the mandates established by
the state pursuant to carrying out its responsibility. It then fol-
lows that some activities might not be open to the private sector
should the national government pass laws prohibiting that activ-
ity.81 Since the laws of the state from which the launch takes
place are controlling, the possibility arises that a non-governmen-
tal entity in one country would be allowed to engage in a certain
space project which a non-governmental entity in another country
could not undertake.8 2 In allocating responsibility for the space
activities of non-governmental entities to states, Article VI also
implicitly grants those entities the right to undertake space
activities.8 3
The Liability Convention of 197284 provides, in great detail, for
the implementation of international liability for damages imposed
78. Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launch-
ing of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its compo-
nent parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies.
Id art. VII.
79. By including "non-governmental entities" within the scope of national re-
sponsibility, the Outer Space Treaty mandates that all future space activities,
whether public or private, will to some extent involve the national government.
Thus, there can never be any truly "private" space activity.
80. See DeSaussure, Toward a Law for Space Transport, The Maritime Anal-
ogy, 14 La'coLN L. REV. 1, 42 (1983); Diederiks-Verschoor & Gormley, supra note 4,
at 141; Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 6
(1979); Vereshchetin, supra note 2, at 35-37. The steps taken by the United States
to carry out this obligation are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 220-39.
81. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the Landsat program.
82. See C. CHRISTOI, supra note 3, at 831-32. In the future, countries desiring
to have private groups use their launching facilities might lower the restrictions
they impose under Article VI. A state that undertakes such an incentive program
must bear in mind, however, that it will ultimately be held internationally respon-
sible for the actions of its customers.
83. Menter, supra note 9, at 61. The effect of this grant upon private invest-
ment in outer space is discussed infra note 217 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 31.
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upon states by Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.85 The Lia-
bility Convention is "the most complex single international space
treaty presently in force as the positive law of the United
States." 86 The scope of this article, however, allows for only a
very general discussion of its terms.87
Article I of the Liability Convention provides important defini-
tions.88 In establishing which parties are subject to liability, the
Convention allocates responsibility based upon a state's role in
the launch of the space object which caused the damage. Owner-
ship of the object is irrelevant.8 9 Thus, all of the states involved
in the launch may be liable rather than the one state which is
technically the "owner" of the object.90 The definition of damages
given in Article I would allow recovery for only the direct dam-
ages caused by the space object. There is no recovery of nominal
or punitive damages.91 The definition of "space object" would in-
clude payloads, e.g., an experiment carried into space by the
Space Shuttle.92
Articles II through VI establish the extent of a state's liability
85. See supra note 78.
86. Management, supra note 9, at 96-97. Much of the complexity arises in the
detailed claims procedure contained in the Convention.
87. For an exhaustive discussion of all aspects of liability in outer space, and a
proposal for an International Court of Outer Space, see M. FORKOSCH, OUTER
SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILrrY (1982). See also Christol, International Liability for
Damage Caused By Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 346 (1980); Diederiks-Ver-
schoor & Gormley, supra note 4, at 145-52; Finch, supra note 23, at 123-27.
88. (a) The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or other im-
pairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of per-
sons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental
organizations;
(b) The term "launching" includes attempted launching;
(c) The term "launching state" means:
(i) A state which launches or procures the launching of a space
object;
(ii) A state from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched;
(d) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space ob-
ject as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.
Liability Convention, supra note 31, art. I.
89. See Impact of Treaties, supra note 1, at 396.
90. For example, the United States' Space Shuttle will be used to carry the
European Space Agency's Spacelab into Earth orbit. If the Spacelab were to fall
to Earth and cause damage, the United States would be liable by virtue of launch-
ing the Spacelab, even though it does not "own" the Spacelab.
91. Space Commerce, supra note 18, at 82-83.
92. Id. at 81.
under different circumstances. 93 Absolute liability is placed on a
93. Article II
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft
in flight.
Article II
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of
the earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or prop-
erty on board such a space object by a space object of another launching
State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the
fault of persons for whom it is responsible.
Article IV
1. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or prop-
erty on board such a space object by a space object of another launching
State, and of damage thereby being caused to a third State or to its natu-
ral or juridical persons, the first two States shall be jointly and severally
liable to the third State, to the extent indicated by the following:
(a) If the damage has been caused to the third State on the surface of
the earth or to aircraft in flight, their liability to the third State shall be
absolute;
(b) If the damage has been caused to a space object of the third State
or to persons or property on board that space object elsewhere than on
the surface of the earth, their liability to the third State shall be based
on the fault of either of the first two States or on the fault of persons for
whom either is responsible.
2. In all cases of joint and several liability referred to in paragraph 1 of
this article, the burden of compensation for the damage shall be appor-
tioned between the first two States in accordance with the extent to which
they were at fault; if the extent of the fault of each of these States cannot
be established, the burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally
between them. Such apportionment shall be without prejudice to the
right of the third State to seek the entire compensation due under this
Convention from any or all of the launching States which are jointly and
severally liable.
Article V
1. Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they
shall be jointly and severally liable for any damage caused.
2. A launching State which has paid compensation for damage shall
have the right to present a claim for indemnification to other participants
in the joint launching. The participants in a joint launching may conclude
agreements regarding the apportioning among themselves of the financial
obligation in respect of which they are jointly and severally liable. Such
agreements shall be without prejudice to the right of a State sustaining
damage to seek the entire compensation due under this Convention from
any or all of the launching States which are jointly and severally liable.
3. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched
shall be regarded as a participant in a joint launching.
Article VI
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, exoneration
from absolute liability shall be granted to the extent that a launching
State establishes that the damage has resulted either wholly or partially
from gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to
cause damage on the part of a claimant State or of natural or juridical per-
sons it represents.
2. No exoneration whatever shall be granted in cases where the dam-
age has resulted from activities conducted by a launching State which are
not in conformity with international law including, in particular, the Char-
ter of the United Nations and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Ac-
tivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
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launching state if the damage occurs on the surface of the Earth
or to aircraft in flight.94 Liability based on fault is applied to a
launching state if the damage occurs "elsewhere than on the sur-
face of the earth to a space object of [another] launching State or
to persons or property on board such a space object.. . ."95 When
damage is caused by a space object that was jointly launched by
two or more states, the Liability Convention provides that they
shall be held jointly and severally liable for the damages. 96 In
cases where two or more states are held to be jointly and sever-
ally liable, provision is made for apportionment and indemnifica-
tion.97 In addition, states engaging in a joint launch are free to
draft an agreement apportioning responsibility among them-
selves.98 Article VI grants exoneration from absolute liability if
the state making the claim is shown to have acted with gross neg-
ligence or intentionally acted or failed to act with the intent to
cause damage, and these actions contributed to the damage. No
exoneration is allowed for a launching state that was not in com-
pliance with international law.99
Parties which are allowed to make claims are specified in Arti-
cles VII00 and VIII.1 01 Citizens of the launching state and foreign
citizens involved in the launch or operation of the space object
Liability Convention, supra note 31, arts. II-VI.
94. Id. arts. II, IV(1)(a).
95. Id. arts. m, IV(1) (b). In keeping with the state's responsibility for the ac-
tions of its citizens, the fault of persons for whom it is responsible will be imputed
to the launching state. Id. The state's recourse against its citizen will depend
upon the laws of that state. Impact of Treatiessupra note 1, at 396.
96. Liability Convention, supra note 31, art. V(1). If one launching state's
space object damages the space object of a second state elsewhere than on the
Earth's surface, and as a result a third state is damaged, the first two states are
also jointly and severally liable. Id. art. V(1).
97. Id. arts. IV(2), V(2).
98. Id. art. V(2). See, e.g., Support of United States Activities at the Canadian
National Research Council Space Research, Sept. 20, 1979, art. XI, 30 U.S.T. 7565,
T.I.A.S. No. 9601, reprinted in 2 UNrrED STATES SPACE LAW, supra note 29, II.B.5 at
47.
99. Liability Convention, supra note 31, art. VI. As a result of this last consid-
eration, any state that was not fulfulling its obligations to authorize and supervise
the space activities of its non-governmental entities would not be entitled to exon-
eration. This is a great incentive for states to take their international responsibili-
ties seriously.
100. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by
a space object of a launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the
operation of that space object from the time of its launching or at any
stage thereafter until its descent, or during such time as they are in the
are not covered by the Convention. 0 2 Such parties would have to
resort to standard national and international avenues for
compensation.
The claims procedure under the Liability Convention is set out
in Articles IX through XI,103 and the procedure to be followed in
resolving any disputes that arise is set forth in Articles XIV
immediate vicinity of a planned launching or recovery area as the result of
an invitation by that launching State.
Id. art. VII.
101. 1. A State which suffers damage, or whose natural or juridical per-
sons suffer damage, may present to a launching State a claim for compen-
sation for such damage.
2. If the State of nationality has not presented a claim another State
may, in respect of damage sustained in its territory by any natural or ju-
ridical person, present a claim to a launching State.
3. If neither the State of nationality nor the State in whose territory
the damage was sustained has presented a claim or notified its intention
of presenting a claim, another State may, in respect of damage sustained
by its permanent residents, present a claim to a launching State.
Id. art. VIII.
102. Id. art. VII. It is assumed that the parties involved in the launch will be
able to work out claims among themselves. The Convention is more concerned
with claims brought by states who had no role in the launch.
103. Article IX
A claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a launching
State through diplomatic channels. If a State does not maintain diplo-
matic relations with the launching State concerned, it may request an-
other State to present its claim to that launching State or otherwise
represent its interests under this Convention. It may also present its
claim through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, provided the
claimant State and the launching State are both Members of the United
Nations.
Article X
1. A claim for compensation for damage may be presented to a launch-
ing State not later than one year following the date of the occurrence of
the damage or the identification of the launching State which is liable.
2. If, however, a State does not know of the occurrence of the damage
or has not been able to identify the launching State which is liable, it may
present a claim within one year following the date on which it learned of
the aforementioned facts; however, this period shall in no event exceed
one year following the date on which the State could reasonably be ex-
pected to have learned of the facts through the exercise of due diligence.
3. The time-limits specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall
apply even if the full extent of the damage may not be known. In this
event, however, the claimant State shall be entitled to revise the claim
and submit additional documentation after the expiration of such time-
limits until one year after the full extent of damage is known.
Article XI
1. Presentation of a claim to a launching State for compensation for
damage under this Convention shall not require the prior exhaustion of
any local remedies which may be available to a claimant State or to natu-
ral or juridical persons it represents.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or juridi-
cal persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in the courts or ad-
ministrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State. A State shall not,
however, be entitled to present a claim under this Convention in respect
of the same damage for which a claim is being pursued in the courts or
administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State or under another
international agreement which is binding on the States concerned.
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through XX.104 Article XII is concerned with the manner by
which the amount of compensation is to be determined. 0 5 This
provision is critical because it calls for the application of an inter-
national rule of law rather than that of any one particular country.
Thus, the amount of compensation will not depend on the laws of
either the responsible launching state or states or those of the
claimant state.106
The Liability Convention does not cover all areas of liability.107
In those areas not covered, existing national and international law
must be considered for relief. Opinions as to the effectiveness of
the Convention vary. Some experts believe the agreement is in-
adequate, 108 others claim it "satisfactorily meet [s] the goal of pro-
viding prompt and adequate compensation to injured parties."'109
In any event, the Convention reinforces the basic principle that
Id. arts. IX-XI.
Under these procedures a claim must be made through diplomatic channels by a
state. There is no provision under this agreement for individuals to make their
own claims, although they could pursue a claim through the normal judicial or ad-
ministrative channels of the launching state.
104. Id. arts. XIV-XX. These articles provide for the establishment of a Claims
Commission to resolve the dispute.
105. The compensation ... shall be determined in accordance with inter-
national law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide
such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the [one] on
whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition which would have ex-
isted if the damage had not occurred.
Id. art. XII.
106. Some consider this article to be the "most critical part of the existing in-
ternational law on this subject." Space Commerce, supra note 18, at 82. Use of this
standard avoids the conflict between compensation laws used by western coun-
tries and those used by socialist countries. Id.
107. Haanappel, Product Liability in Space Law, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 55, 56
(1979). Some areas not covered by the Liability Convention are: 1) the liability of
a private person or organization to an injured party and to the launching state
which bears liability under the Convention; 2) the liability if damage occurs in a
state not party to the agreement or is caused by the space object of a non-party;
and 3) the liability for injury to citizens of the launching state or foreign citizens
involved in the operation. Id.
There is also uncertainty as to recovery for damage done in space by a person
rather than a space object. Hoover, Law and Security in Outer Space from the
Viewpoint of Private Industry, 11 J. SPACE L. 115, 119 (1983).
108. E.g., Tamm, Hail? No-It's Skylab, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 131 (1979).
109. Christol, supra note 87, at 369. For an example demonstrating the effective
use of the Liability Convention, see Canada's Claim Against the U.S.S.R. Arising
out of the Cosmos 954 Incident and the Claim's Settlement, reprinted in 2 UNrrED
STATES SPACE LAW, supra note 29, I.D.2. Canada eventually received three million
Canadian dollars in settlement for the costs incurred by the Canadian government
in cleaning up the radioactive debris from Cosmos 954. Id. at 8.
states are internationally responsible for their national activities
in outer space.
7. The state of registry retains jurisdiction and control over a
space object and its personnel.
The seventh basic principle of international space law is estab-
lished by Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty."10 Under the
terms of this Article, jurisdiction and control over a space object
and its personnel remains with the state of registry while the ob-
ject and personnel are in outer space or on a celestial body.11
Thus, a space object and its personnel have the same status with
regard to the state of registry, whether they are on Earth or in
outer space.
"The term State of registry means a launching State on whose
registry a space object is carried in accordance with article Ir' of
the Registration Convention.112 Article II of the Registration Con-
vention requires a launching state to register any object it
launches into Earth orbit or beyond. The contents of the registra-
tion and the procedures for maintaining it are left to the discre-
tion of the individual state.1 3 Where two or more states join in
launching a space object, they must agree between themselves as
to which will be the state of registry.114 Their agreement on which
party will be the state of registry does not prohibit them from
making additional agreements to allocate jurisdiction and control
over the object and its personnel."15
Although Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national
110. A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into
outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such ob-
ject, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects
landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is
not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by
their return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond
the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are car-
ried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, fur-
nish identifying data prior to their return.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. VIHI.
111. Article VIII also provides for the return of space objects to their state of
registry. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75.
112. Registration Convention, supra note 32, art. I.
113. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of
Space of the Government of India and the United States National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Concerning the Furnishing of Launching and Associated
Services for Indian National Satellite System - I Spacecraft, July 18, 1978, art. V, 30
U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 9285, reprinted in 2 UNrrED STATES SPACE LAw, supra note
29, II.B.10 at 12. The agreement calls for India to register each satellite launched
for it by NASA under the agreement.
115. Registration Convention, supra note 32, art. 11.
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appropriation of space by claims of sovereignty, by use or occupa-
tion, or by any other means," 6 the state of registry is not forbid-
den to "exercise sovereign rights unrelated to national
appropriation."" 7 Thus a state could "require other States to re-
frain from interfering with the direction and supervision of [an]
object or with any of the technical arrangements necessary for
the fulfillment of its mission of exploration and use of outer
space." 118 In addition to exerting control over the object, the state
may also enforce its jurisdiction over space personnel."19 In other
words, the civil and criminal laws of the state of registry may be
extended to include nationals of that state who are in outer space
or on a celestial body.
It is important that a state retain jurisdiction and control over
its space objects and personnel while they are in space or on a ce-
lestial body because of the state's international responsibility for
national activities in space. Without jurisdiction and control, the
state could not ensure that the object or personnel obey interna-
tional space law. Thus, Article VI1120 and the Registration Con-
vention' 2' provide states with the means to carry out the
obligations imposed upon them by the international agreements
respecting space activities.
8. The exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies
is to be guided by the principle of international
cooperation.
The principle of exploration and use of space appears in the
preamble,122 Article 1,123 and Articles IX through XI of the Outer
Space Treaty.124 International cooperation is intended to perme-
ate all space activity, and certain concrete steps to achieve this
116. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. U. See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 48-50.
117. Gorove, supra note 50, at 9.
118. M. LACHs, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 69-70 (1972).
119. "If a genuine link exists between a State and individuals deemed to be its
nationals, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the state of nationality will follow all
such persons into outer space." Glazer, Domicile and Industry in Outer Space, 17
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 67, 104 (1978).
120. See supra note 110.
121. See supra note 32.
122. See supra note 38.
123. See supra note 39.
124. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, arts. IX-XI. See infra notes 125, 128 &
129 for the text of these articles.
goal have already been taken. Article IX requires that all states
conduct their activities with due regard to the corresponding in-
terests of other states.125 States must also avoid harmful contami-
nation or adverse changes of the Earth's environment in the
course of their activities. 126 Finally, Article IX requires a state
which has reason to believe its space activities might cause poten-
tially harmful interference with the lawful space activities of an-
other state to undertake appropriate international consultations
before carrying out its activity. Likewise, a state may request
consultation if it has reason to believe another state's activities
might harmfully interfere with its own lawful space activities. 127
Additional steps to promote international cooperation are pro-
vided in Articles X128 and X1129 of the Outer Space Treaty. Arti-
125. In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the
principle of co-operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties
to the Treaty. States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct explora-
tion of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse
changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction
of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to be-
lieve that an activity or experiment planned by it or its national in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause poten-
tially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to
the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment
planned by another State Party in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the
activity or experiment.
Id. art. IX.
126. Id.
127. Id. The channels through which such consultations would take place have
not been established. One possibility would be for the United States to use the
State Department to respond to any requests or to make any requests of its own.
A United States corporation would have to go through the government to request
such consultations.
128. In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and
use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in con-
formity with the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty
shall consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States Parties
to the Treaty to be afforded an opportunity to observe the flight of space
objects launched by those States.
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions
under which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement be-
tween the States concerned.
Id. art. X.
129. In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful explora-
tion and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activi-
ties in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to
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cle X requires a state to consider, on an equal basis, any requests
by other states to observe the flight of space objects launched by
that state.130 Article XI requires launching states to inform the
world of the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their space
activities. 131 Through international cooperation, it is hoped that
conflict in space can be avoided and there will be no interference
in the freedom to explore and use outer space and celestial
bodies.132
C. Current Issues in International Space Law
The Outer Space Treaty and the international agreements 33
that followed cover many different legal issues which might arise
during the exploration and use of outer space and the celestial
bodies. There are some important legal issues, however, that
have not yet been resolved. The eventual solutions to these ques-
tions will undoubtedly have an impact on the commercial use of
outer space. The main issues of current interest and importance
are: (1) ratification of the Moon Treaty; (2) direct broadcast satel-
lites; (3) remote sensing; (4) the definition and/or delimitation of
space and the geostationary orbit; and (5) the use of nuclear
power sources in outer space. 134
1. Ratification of the Moon Treaty.
The purpose of the Moon Treaty,135 as set forth in its preamble,
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public
and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible
and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activ-
ities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and
effectively.
Id. art. XI.
130. See supra note 128.
131. See supra note 129.
132. One criticism made of this principle, and the agreements creating it, is the
lack of any effective relief for a state or non-governmental entity that experiences
interference with its rights. Hoover, supra note 107, at 121. A possible solution
would be the drafting of a treaty, patterned after the Liability Convention, which
would allow recovery for damages caused by unlawful interference with rights re-
specting outer space.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
134. See generally Galloway, supra note 47, at 26-29; Gorove, Current Issues of
Space Law Before the United Nations, 11 J. SPACE L 5 (1983); Small, Security As-
pects of the Current United Nations Space Law Agenda, 11 J, SPACE L. 51 (1983).
135. Moon Treaty, supra note 33. Article 1 of the Moon Treaty applies to the
Moon, orbits around or to the Moon, and orbits to other celestial bodies within the
is to promote cooperation among states on an equal basis in ex-
ploring the Moon, to prevent international conflict, and to define
and develop the existing legal documents relating to the Moon.136
The overall emphasis is on controlling the exploitation of the nat-
ural resources of the Moon. Article 11137 is the primary section
dealing with lunar natural resources. This Article is also the
center of debate over ratification of the Treaty.138 Critics argue
that the provisions of Article 11 will hinder the future exploitation
of the Moon's resources.13 9 Proponents feel that the Treaty is nec-
essary to ensure that mutual exploitation of the lunar resources
solar system, Id. art. 1. Therefore, all references herein made to the Moon shall
also include these other segments of the space environment, unless otherwise
indicated.
136. Determined to promote on the basis of equality the further develop-
ment of co-operation among States in the exploration and use of the moon
and other celestial bodies,
Desiring to prevent the moon from becoming an area of international
conflict ....
Taking into account the need to define and develop the provisions of
these international instruments in relation to the moon and other celestial
bodies, having regard to further progress in the exploration and use of
outer space ....
Id. preamble (emphasis in original).
137. 1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement,
in particular in paragraph 5 of this article.
2. The moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part
thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State,
international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, na-
tional organization, or non-governmental entity or of any natural person.
The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations
and installations on or below the surface of the moon, including structures
connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not create a right of owner-
ship over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof.
The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international regime
referred to in paragraph 5 of this article.
4. States Parties have the right to exploration and use of the moon
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accord-
ance with international law and the provisions of this Agreement.
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an
international regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is
about to become feasible ....
Moon Treaty, supra note 33, art. 11(1)-(5).
138. The other articles of the Moon Treaty add to or clarify existing law in
many areas, including peaceful use of the Moon, information about lunar missions,
use of lunar samples for scientific purposes, protection of personnel on the Moon,
and liability and jurisdiction on the Moon. None of these articles have met with
any significant criticism. See Hosenbali, supra note 28, at 100-05 (containing a
comprehensive list of the areas of international space law clarified by the Treaty).
139. See, e.g., Walsh, Controversial Issues under Article XI of the Moon Treaty, 6
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 489 (1981); Comment, Americans and the Moon Treaty, 46
J. Aix L. & CoM. 729 (1981).
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will be possible.140
Generally, Article 11 states that the Moon and its natural re-
sources are the "common heritage of mankind." The Moon and
its resources are not subject to appropriation by any claims of
sovereignty or to ownership by any state, intergovernmental or-
ganization, or non-governmental entity.141 According to Article 11,
states shall have the freedom to explore and use the Moon on an
equal basis. An international regime to govern the exploitation of
the Moon's resources shall be established when such exploitation
becomes feasible.142
The rules set forth in Article 11 do not appear out of line with
the provisions of existing space law. The Article emphasizes
three principles: international cooperation; no national appropria-
tion; and freedom to explore and use space. These three princi-
ples are set forth in the Outer Space Treaty.143 Why, then, are so
many countries hesitant to sign and ratify the Treaty?'" One un-
derlying reason is a lack of urgency since there are no present
plans to exploit the natural resources of the Moon or other celes-
tial bodies. The more important reason, however, is the concern
over the different interpretations of the "common heritage of
mankind" principle as it applies to an equitable sharing of re-
sources, and the establishment of the future international
regime.145
Opponents of the Moon Treaty interpret paragraph 1, taken in
conjunction with paragraph 5,146 as placing a moratorium on the
commercial exploitation of resources until the international re-
gime is established. This interpretation is supported by the terms
of the Treaty itself. Article 6 specifically allows scientific investi-
gation of the Moon,147 but nowhere in the Treaty is commercial
140. See, e.g., Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, 14 INT'L LAW. 429 (1980); Menter, Commercial Space Activities Under the Moon
Treaty, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 213 (1979).
141. See supra note 137.
142. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 39-50, 122-132.
144. See supra note 34.
145. Galloway, Law and Security in Outer Space: The Role of Congress in Space
Law and Policy, 11 J. SPACE L. 35, 49 (1983).
146. See supra note 137.
147. 'There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by all
States Parties without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in
accordance with international law." Moon Treaty, supra note 33, art. 6(1).
exploitation specifically approved.148 The purported basis for this
moratorium would be to protect those resources which are the
common heritage of the world until such time as the international
regime can oversee commercial exploitation.149
The second argument advanced by Moon Treaty opponents is
that the international regime will be unsympathetic to free enter-
prise. The socialist states and third world countries will allegedly
have the power to regulate and control commercial use to such an
extent that it will be economically unfeasible for companies to un-
dertake private ventures.150 In examining the Moon Treaty, oppo-
nents conclude that "the marginal advantages which might be
made in a few provisions are far outweighed by the enormous sac-
rifice that would be required of our Nation's future economic in-
terests in space development."151
Supporters of the Moon Treaty reject the idea that Article 11
imposes a moratorium on commercial exploitation of the Moon's
resources.152 This interpretation of the Treaty is based on two
148. See Christol, The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The
Search for a Position, 9 J. SPACE. L. 77, 79 (1981); Dula, supra note 80, at 16; Com-
ment, supra note 139, at 750-53.
149. Comment, supra note 139, at 750-53. Commercial entities fear such a mora-
torium because of the uncertainty surrounding the proposed legal regime. The re-
gime is not to be established until exploitation becomes feasible, but if there is a
moratorium on commercial activities, a corporation might not be able to proceed
with pilot projects necessary for establishing feasibility. Thus, the moratorium
could continue for an indefinite period of time and commercial activities on the
Moon would be foreclosed.
150. Christol, supra note 148, at 79; Dula, supra note 80, at 16; Comment, supra
note 139, at 750-53.
Much of this concern is generated by an examination of the international regime
set forth in the Law of the Sea Treaty. If this regime was used as a pattern, indus-
try's "right to participate, or to continue operating, or to retain its technology, or to
retain and control the benefit derived from its activities" would be affected. All of
these areas would be "subjected to the economic, political, and nationalistic con-
siderations of an international body or organization and the member states
thereof...." Hoover, supra note 107, at 121.
The concerns over the international regime are valid, yet one important factor is
often overlooked. Any regime charged with overseeing the exploitation of the
Moon's resources will have to take into account the interests of the states actually
involved in the exploitation. Otherwise, these states will not join in the regime
and it will be powerless. Thus, the United States, as one of the few countries with
the capital and technology to engage in lunar exploitation, would be able to play a
determinative role in the creation of the international regime. If third world na-
tions try to set up an oppressive regime, the United States would simply refuse to
take part, thus depriving the other countries of any of the benefits of the Moon.
151. Comment, supra note 139, at 754 (quoting a memorandum written by the
L-5 Society in rebuttal to a State Department Bulletin supporting the Moon
Treaty).
152. "The purpose and intent of the Moon Treaty ... is to allow for the present
exploitation of moon resources. It is only the establishment of the international
regime that is to await exploitation .... The regime is to follow the exploitation-
not the exploitation to follow the regime." Christol, supra note 140, at 476.
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factors. First, the Outer Space Treaty grants the right to exploit
the lunar resources and the Moon Treaty does not expressly over-
rule that right. Second, the negotiated history of the Moon Treaty
supports the "no moratorium" interpretation.15 3 During prelimi-
nary Treaty negotiations, the United States made unilateral state-
ments defining its position that the Treaty would not create a
moratorium.154 These statements were never contradicted by any
other country. Therefore, the statements of the United States
must be recognized in interpreting the Treaty155 Based on these
uncontradicted assertions, the Moon Treaty's proponents are con-
fident that ratification of the Treaty would not create a morato-
rium on exploitation of lunar resources. The Moon Treaty's
supporters are also confident that the proposed international re-
gime will not be prohibitive to commercial exploitation. The pro-
ponents argue that an international regime will not be created for
many years and will not be obligated to assume any special
form.15 6 If the United States desires to participate in the eventual
creation of the international regime, it must ratify the Treaty. 5 7
Pro-Treaty forces also assert that developing countries will not
have any greater power in the operation of the international re-
153. See Comment, supra note 139, at 755-56. See also C. CHRISTOL, supra note
3, at 278-79 (the phrase "in place" in paragraph 3 allows ownership by the acquirer
of lunar resources after they are removed from the Moon).
154. "[T]he United States is not prepared to accept an express or implied pro-
hibition on the exploitation of possible natural resources .... In our view, the
Moon agreement cannot reasonably seek to require that exploitation must await
the establishment of the treaty-based regime." Hosenball, supra note 28, at 103
(quoting the United States representative's statement before the Legal Subcom-
mittee of COPUOS, April, 19, 1973). "The draft agreement. . . as part of the com-
promises made by many delegations, places no moratorium upon the exploitation
of the natural resources on celestial bodies, pending the establishment of an inter-
national regime." Id. at 104 (quoting a statement made by the United States repre-
sentative on July 3, 1979). The Soviet Union also expressed its opposition to any
pre-regime moratorium. Comment, supra note 139, at 756.
155. Customary international law, as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 39/27, opened for signature May 23, 1969, pro-
vides that United Nations documentation of a treaty's negotiation shall be used in
interpreting the provisions of the agreement. See Menter, supra note 140, at 222.
156. See supra note 137. Article 11(5) of the Moon Treaty, supra note 137, gives
no indication of what form the international regime is to take. All that is man-
dated is the creation of "appropriate procedures" to govern exploitation of the
Moon's resources.
157. The rebuttal to this argument is that no international regime will be likely
to arise if the two space powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, do not
ratify the Treaty. Even if the rest of the world undertook to create such a regime,
it would be useless if the countries involved in exploitation of the Moon's re-
sources were not a part of the organization.
gime than they had in drafting the Moon Treaty.158
Some Treaty supporters have called for the ratification of the
Treaty to be accompanied by understandings and declarations ex-
pressing the United States' interpretation of the Treaty. 59 An
"understanding" filed by a state is an interpretation of the treaty's
terms. A "declaration" is a national statement of policy concern-
ing the treaty. "When such qualifications relate to the interna-
tional application of the agreement, such formal statements
become binding in international law between the United States
and those States which either accept or do not object to the indi-
cated national position."' 60 Thus, the United States could not be
held to an interpretation in conflict with its own expressed inter-
pretation of the Moon Treaty.16 1 There is a risk, however, that all
states might ratify the Treaty with their own understandings. In
that event, the general agreement and its negotiated history
would lose all meaning-it would be as if no Treaty existed at
all.1 6 2 Presently, the opponents of the Moon Treaty appear to
have persuaded the United States not to ratify the Treaty. As
long as the United States and the Soviet Union elect not to ratify
the agreement, the Moon Treaty is unlikely to become effective.
It is clear, however, that the Treaty still has significance. When
technology develops to the point at which exploitation of the
Moon's natural resources is imminent, the Moon Treaty will be
the starting point for developing the international law that will
control lunar exploitation. 63
158. See Comment, supra note 139, at 755-58. This argument assumes the valid-
ity of the earlier pro-Moon Treaty arguments. If these arguments are incorrect
and the Treaty does create a moratorium, developing countries should be able to
create an equally oppressive international regime, since they will have as much
power as they had in drafting the Moon Treaty.
159. The American Bar Association Section of International Law and the Sec-
tion of Natural Resources have taken this position and have also outlined the prin-
ciples that should be included in the United States' declarations. American Bar
Association, Report to the House of Delegates 1 (1981), reprinted in Christol, supra
note 148, at 90-91.
160. Christol, supra note 148, at 88.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 82.
163. The United States, by failing to ratify the Moon Treaty, seems to have ac-
cepted the arguments of the Treaty's opponents. The basic principle behind all of
these arguments is the fear that private enterprise will not be able to engage in
commercial exploitation of the Moon. An argument can be made that this attitude
is exactly why the Moon Treaty is needed. If "international co-operation" and the
"common heritage of mankind" are to have any real effect, the profit motive must
be subordinated in favor of a service motive. In ratifying the Outer Space Treaty,
the United States agreed that it would carry out its space activities for the benefit
and in the interest of all countries. See art. I, supra note 39. This country's com-
mittment to that principle is questionable when the primary factor in judging the
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2. Direct broadcast satellites.
Direct broadcast satellites may be used to transmit directly into
a country without that country's consent. The members of
COPUOS,164 and of the United Nations General Assembly differ
sharply regarding the type of international restrictions, if any,
that should be placed upon the use of direct broadcast
satellites.165
The United States views all people as having an unrestricted
right of access to information.166 Third world nations assert that
every country has a sovereign right to control the information en-
tering it if that country deems it necessary to protect its citi-
zens.167 There is, however, general agreement that some form of
international agreement dealing with direct broadcast satellites
should be sought. The different views respecting such an agree-
ment are based on fundamentally opposing political philosophies
and any mutually acceptable agreement is unlikely at the present
time.' 68 As a result, there is little discussion concerning this issue
and COPUOS has removed the issue from its agenda. 69
merits of the Moon Treaty is whether or not American businesses will be able to
retain all their profits.
The greatest obstacle to ratification of the Moon Treaty in the United States is
the split within this country as to how the rest of the world will interpret the Moon
Treaty. The negotiated history, besides clarifying the United States' position, also
expresses the views of the other states involved in drafting the Moon Treaty.
When the anti-Treaty forces within the United States put aside their "what-ifs"
and look at what is, the Moon Treaty stands a good chance of ratification. This
point may not come, however, until the United States actually begins to exploit
the Moon's resources and the Treaty's opponents realize how strong the United
States' bargaining position really is.
164. For a discussion of COPUOS, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying
text; Gorove, supra note 28, at 201.
165. See Galloway, supra note 47, at 26; Gorove, supra note 28, at 201.
166. See Galloway, supra note 47, at 26.
167. See Gorove, supra note 28, at 201.
168. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1982 which
consisted of principles for regulating direct broadcast satellites. This resolution
bypassed the normal procedure of achieving a consensus in COPUOS before going
to the General Assembly. Thus, many countries disagree with some or all of the
principles. There is some question whether this resolution will have any value in
the drafting of an international agreement. See Current Documents, 10 J. SPACE L.
252 (1982) reprinting the General Assembly's resolution; Gorove, supra note 134,
at 5; Jasentuliyana, Review of the Work of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 11 J. SPACE L. 125, 129 (1983); supra note 28.
169. See Gorove, supra note 134, at 5.
3. Remote sensing.
The current agenda before COPUOS includes the "Illegal im-
plications of remote sensing[l7 0 ] of the Earth from space, with the
aim of formulating draft principles."171 Draft principles have been
developed, but many of its portions do not have the consensus ap-
proval of all countries in COPUOS.172 The basic question which
remains to be answered is "whether there should be unlimited
freedom to disseminate data and information gained by remote
sensing or whether it [is] necessary to require consent by the
sensed state[173] and impose restrictions" upon the dissemination
of the data.'7 4
Three different views relating to remote sensing have been
presented and argued before COPUOS. The underdeveloped
countries contend that they have a sovereign right to any informa-
tion regarding their own resources, and a right to forbid dissemi-
nation of the data to other nations. 75 The Soviet Union and other
socialist states have taken the position that certain types of data
should be freely available while other types should be re-
stricted,76 and that states should be responsible for all remote
sensing activities because private, non-governmental entities
might misuse the technology.177 The United States believes that
all states should be able to conduct remote sensing and that infor-
mation generated should be freely disseminated. 78 In addition,
the United States contends that a sensed state has no sovereign
170. Remote sensing is the use of satellites to obtain data regarding the natural
resources of a specific region on the Earth's surface.
171. Gorove, supra note 134, at 5. COPUOS meets annually and utilizes an
agenda containing the issues that were not decided during negotiations at the pre-
vious year's meetings.
172. Id. at 6. See Current Documents, 11 J. SPACE L. 165 (1983) (texts of draft
principles on remote sensing).
173. A sensed state is the country whose natural resources have been explored
by remote sensing satellites.
174. Gorove, supra note 134, at 6.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Id. One criterion that might be used to differentiate would be the degree
of resolution of the data. That is, data with a very high resolution, or showing
great detail, would be restricted. No threshold of resolution has been established.
Id.
177. Id. "If receiving stations were in private hands and the operators of these
stations felt free to treat the data they received as a marketable commodity ... a
very different and unpleasant situation could arise." Id. (quoting Soviet Union
views expressed during 1983 COPUOS meeting). The Soviet Union's position
probably grows out of its basic political and philosophical distrust of private
enterprise.
178. "All countries should have an opportunity to participate in remote sensing
activities through international cooperation, and remote sensing data should be as
freely accessible as possible. . . ." Id. at 8 (quoting statement by United States at
the 1983 meeting of COPUOS).
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rights in data concerning it; and furthermore, that the United
States has no international responsibility for the manner in which
its nationals make use of data collected by the United States.17 9
Resolution of this philosophical conflict is more likely to come
through the world-wide availability of remote sensing technology
than from political change. The basic concern of the developing
countries is not the gathering of information; rather, it is the man-
ner in which the information is used.180 No consent is required to
engage in remote sensing. If all countries had remote sensing ca-
pability, they would all have access to the information and, thus,
the question of dissemination would be moot. As more countries
participate in remote sensing projects, emphasis will shift away
from controls on access to data towards control of the use of
data.181 When this stage is reached, an international agreement
will be more likely since principles banning the misuse of data
should be agreeable to most countries. 82
4. The definition and/or delimitation of space and the
geostationary orbit.
The question of where outer space begins has been debated
since interest in international space law first began.183 Since 1976,
concerns over use of the geostationary184 orbit have been consid-
ered along with the delimitation/definition question. COPUOS'
179. Id. Even if the United States has no legal responsibility to control the pri-
vate use of data it collects, it would seem that the United States should feel some
sense of moral responsiblity not to allow or participate in the misuse of data it
gathers concerning another country's natural resources.
180. Id.
181. See Gorove, supra note 134, at 13; Small, Security Aspects of the Current
United Nations Space Law Agenda, 11 J. SPACE L. 51, 53 (1983). It is both imprac-
tical and unnecessary to require all countries to launch their own remote sensing
satellites. A few satellites servicing all nations is more efficient. But the realiza-
tion that all countries could legally engage in remote sensing helps to focus on the
important issue-how the data is used.
182. Establishing controls on the fair use of data should be an easier task than
creating a compromise between the philosophies of national sovereignty and free-
dom of access to information. The existing international laws regulating unfair
competition and unfair trade practices might provide a starting point for dealing
with these problems. Gorove, supra note 134, at 13.
183. See supra text accompanying note 25.
184. The geostationary orbit is an orbit around the Earth at approximately
22,300 miles. An object in this orbit travels at the same speed as the Earth's rota-
tion. Thus, the object remains fixed over a specific location on Earth. Telecommu-
nications satellites must be in a geostationary orbit to be effective. This orbit is
sometimes referred to as a geosynchronous orbit.
agenda now includes "[m] atters relating to the definition and/or
delimitation of outer space activities, bearing in mind, inter alia,
questions relating to the geostationary orbit."185
The airspace above a country is within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of that country. 8 6 The state has broad powers to control
what goes on within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. It may
regulate or prevent access, exit, or transit of manned or un-
manned aircraft. 87 Under the Outer Space Treaty, national sov-
ereignty does not extend into outer space. 88 Thus, the question
arises, where does airspace end and outer space begin? There is
division within COPUOS whether the question really requires an
answer. No clear consensus regarding where the line should be
drawn has been reached by those countries that desire a definite
demarcation. 89
Advocates of the need for a definition argue that the existing in-
ternational treaties covering outer space require a precise defini-
tion of outer space for proper application of international treaties.
The logical gap of creating a law of outer space without defining
what constitutes outer space creates legal ambiguities requiring
resolution.190
Opponents of a definition claim that an arbitrary decision at
this point in time might deter further developments in space.'91
They argue that no problems have arisen due to the lack of a defi-
nition, and that it is better to maintain the status quo rather than
risk creating a definition that may cause problems at a later
date. 192 Therefore, an international agreement is not presently
185. Gorove, supra note 134, at 5; see also Galloway, supra note 47, at 27.
186. Regulation, supra note 9, at 157.
187. Id.
188. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 29, art. II; supra note 48 (text of Arti-
cle II); supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
189. Gorove, supra note 134, at 10.
190. See Gorove, supra note 28, at 205 (quoting remarks made by Daniel Cas-
sidy); see also Cheng, supra note 57 (author criticizes the United States for oppos-
ing any definition); Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, 8 J. SPACE L. 154
(1980) (discussion of history of debate and proposal of a definition).
191. An arbitrary definition made in light of current technology may be overly
restrictive when applied to future technology. The definition might affect develop-
ments which are presently beyond imagination.
192. See Gorove, supra note 28, at 205 (quoting remarks made by Daniel Cas-
sidy); see also Gorove, supra note 134, at 14 (no pressing need for a definition or
physical demarcation); STS, supra note 1, at 634 (Space Shuttle does not create a
need for a definition of space); Rosenfield, Where Airspace Ends and Outer Space
Begins, 7 J. SPACE L. 137, 147 (1979) (no present need to set a limit).
Some who argue against a definition believe that a customary rule of interna-
tional law is developing which sets the boundary of outer space at a point just be-
low the lowest altitude at which a satellite can orbit without falling back to Earth.
See Regulation, supra note 9, at 157; Gorove, supra note 134, at 11; Kopal, supra
note 190, at 172-73.
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needed.
Those countries requesting a legal definition of outer space gen-
erally advocate a "spatial" definition, consisting of a precise phys-
ical demarcation line set at a specific altitude.193 Those countries
that believe there is no present need for a definition generally
support a "functional" definition, if a definition must be made.194
Based upon a functional definition, space would be defined ac-
cording to activities rather than location. Certain activities would
be considered space activities no matter where they occurred, and
would be regulated by the law of outer space. Other activities
would be classified as airspace activities and would be governed
accordingly. 95 The "functional" definition allows for greater flex-
ibility as technology develops new space capabilities. For in-
stance, a new activity clearly affecting outer space might fall
outside of space law simply because it was not foreseen when an
arbitrary boundary was established. The flexibility of the "func-
tional" definition would allow this type of activity to evolve under
proper international rules. 96
On December 3, 1976, eight equatorial countries197 meeting in
Bogota, Columbia, issued a declaration which added to the defini-
tion/delimitation debate. The 1976 Bogota Declaration' 98 asserted
that the geostationary orbit'99 is a natural resource of the equato-
rial states and is thus subject to their sovereignty. The Declara-
tion claimed that no object shall be placed in a geostationary orbit
without the authorization of the underlying states. Further, it was
asserted that the Outer Space Treaty does not apply to the geos-
tationary orbit.200
Until the Bogota Declaration, the geostationary orbit was as-
193. At least nine different spatial approaches to defining and/or delimiting
outer space have been suggested. See Rosenfield, supra note 192, at 139-40. The
Soviet Union made a proposal in 1979 that the region above 100 or 110 kilometers
above sea level be defined as outer space. C. CHRISTOI, supra note 3, at 488-89.
194. The United States falls into this category.
195. See Gorove, supra note 134, at 11-12.
196. See infra note 219.
197. An equatorial state is a country which is traversed by the Equator. The
eight countries were Brazil, Colombia, the Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire. Gabon and Somalia are the only equatorial countries not join-
ing in the declaration.
198. First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, El Espectador (Colombia), Dec. 3,
1976, reprinted in C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 891-95.
199. See supra note 184.
200. See Sloup, Outer Space Delimitation Proposals: Enlightened Jurisprudence
sumed to be a part of outer space and was included in the Outer
Space Treaty's provision forbidding national appropriation by
claims of sovereignty.201 Countries continually utilized the orbit
in their space activities. 202 The equatorial countries challenged
this idea based upon a declaration of legal conclusions arising out
of scientific and technological data. 203 Those states involved in
space activities objected to the Declaration's scientific assump-
tions, arguing that the Outer Space Treaty does, in fact, apply to
the geostationary orbit.204 These states viewed the Bogota Decla-
ration as a political statement unsupported by either scientific
and technological data or international law.205 Conversely, many
third world countries expressed support for the Declaration. It is
presumed that developing nations are seeking greater control
over the allocation of radio frequencies for use by geostationary
telecommunications satellites and acknowledge the Bogota Decla-
ration as a means of attaining such control.206
Although the Bogota Declaration is generally held to have no le-
gal merit,207 it has served to focus attention on third world con-
cerns for equitable access to the geostationary orbit. Thus, the
Bogota Declaration has been effective from a political stand-
point.208 The future of the definition/delimitation question may
well be decided by politics rather than any scientific distinction
or Celestial Shakedown? Some Implications for Private Enterprise, 2 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 87, 91-94 (1979).
The Bogota Declaration affects the definition/delimitation debate because of its
claims of ownership. Under the Outer Space Treaty, no part of outer space is sub-
ject to claims of national appropriation. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
If the equatorial states do in fact own the geostationary orbit then the boundary
between airspace and outer space must be set above that orbit. All of the pro-
posed spatial definitions fall well below the altitude of the geostationary orbit. See
supra note 193.
201. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14 & 184.
203. Sloup, supra note 200, at 94.
204. See id. at 95-97 ("[N]o scientific or legal basis for a unilateral claim to ex-
clusive national sovereignty over that orbit").
205. Id. at 94.
206. Gorove, supra note 134, at 12.
207. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 511-21. "Scholarly analyses of the claims
of the equatorial States - except for those emanating from the equatorial States
- have been uniformly adverse to the terms of the Bogota Declaration." Id. at
513.
208. The 1985 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) is expected to
address procedures to "guarantee in practice equitable access to the geostationary
orbit." Stowe, The Leqal and Political Considerations of the 1985 World Adminis-
trative Radio Conference, 11 J. SPACE L. 61, 62 (1983); Gorove, supra note 134, at
14. It is hoped that a solution can be worked out that will be satisfactory to the
countries using the geostationary orbit today and the countries concerned that
they will be deprived of ever getting to use the orbit. But see Stowe, supra note
53, where the author warns that political factors have taken the place of technolog-
ical factors and pose a threat to the United States' economic interests.
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between airspace and outer space.2 09
5. The use of nuclear power sources in outer space.
The COPUOS agenda includes "[c]onsideration of the possibil-
ity of supplementing the norms of international law relevant to
the use of nuclear power sources in outer space."2 10 Interest in
this subject arose as a result of the Cosmos 954 crash in 1978.
This Soviet satellite was powered by a nuclear reactor which dis-
integrated during re-entry and caused radioactive contamination
in Canada, the site of the crash.2 11
Some members of COPUOS believe that the Liability Conven-
tion 212 is insufficient to deal with all the issues which may arise
when a space object carrying radioactive materials crashes on
Earth.213 In response to the Cosmos incident, Canada submitted
a working paper with the hope of establishing international rules
governing the use of nuclear power sources in outer space. 214 So
far, COPUOS has only agreed that if a space object utilizing a nu-
clear power source should malfunction, the launching state is ob-
ligated to notify any state which may be affected by the space
object's re-entry.21 5 The prospect of the use of nuclear power
sources in outer space is controversial and there is little doubt it
will be the subject of much debate in the future.
IV. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW ON PRIVATE
ACTIVITY IN OUTER SPACE
Private use and exploitation of outer space will require enor-
mous amounts of capital. Before any company considers invest-
ing in a space project, it should examine all of the factors which
might affect that project's success. International space law will be
209. Practically speaking, a political solution is probably more useful than a sci-
entific solution. A stable political environment will benefit international coopera-
tion in the exploration, use, and exploitation of outer space more than a
technically correct definition of space that is ignored by the nations of the world.
210. Gorove, supra note 134, at 5.
211. Id. at 8-9; see supra note 109 (discussion of claims arising from the crash).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 79-109.
213. Gorove, supra note 134, at 9.
214. Id. at 9-10. These rules would include: (1) providing notice of the use of
nuclear power sources to other countries; (2) giving notice of any reentry of space
objects with nuclear power sources; and (3) liability for expenses and damages in-
curred during the search and subsequent clean-up of radioactive materials. Id.
215. Id. at 10.
one factor to consider because it has a definite impact on private
space activities. The law of outer space has a direct effect on the
relationships between private entities and the United States, as
well as those with the world community. Furthermore, there are
indirect effects which are equally as important as any direct ac-
tion of international law.
A. Direct Effects on Private Activity
1. Corporations and the world.2 16
The basic principles of the international law of outer space are
as important to corporations as they are to states because these
principles apply equally to both. The overriding principles of in-
ternational cooperation and peaceful use establish a philosophy
toward space that corporations must consider. The most impor-
tant effect of space law may be that it characterizes outer space
differently. The countries of the world have agreed to attempt to
keep strife and dissension confined to Earth. The message of the
Outer Space Treaty is simple---"We do not have to make the same
mistakes again!"
Does this mean that corporations may not use outer space for
commercial endeavors? The answer is clearly no. Corporations
have the right to use all of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies. The use for commercial gain, however,
must remain peaceful and "the benefits derived from space must
be shared with all humankind."2 17 Sharing expected benefits
does not necessarily mean sharing profits, but rather is intended
more as a philosophical guideline. The manner in which a benefit
will be shared depends upon the nature of the benefit and the ac-
tivity which generates the benefit. Countries that use commercial
satellites for world-wide, instantaneous communications are shar-
ing in the benefits that come from space activities even though
the profits go to the country or corporation which owns the
satellite.
The freedom to exploit outer space is an important aspect of in-
ternational space law. Corporations reap further benefits to the
extent that peaceful coexistence is maintained in space. A peace-
216. The private entities which will make commercial use of space are not
limited to corporations, but the corporate structure is such a common one that for
purposes of this discussion "corporation" will be used to refer to any type of for-
profit, non-governmental organization.
217. Tennen, supra note 11, at 149. See also Hoover, supra note 107, at 118 (pri-
vate industry free to conduct its activities anywhere in space); Reijnen, Outer
Space Law and Private Enterprise in Outer Space: An International Perspective, 2
Hous. J. INT'L L. 65, 69 (1979) ("Outer space . .. can be used by private enter-
prise"); supra note 9.
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ful environment is a commercially productive environment be-
cause corporations are able to operate without external
disruption. Although elementary, it is true that "Outer Space
Peace is essential to private enterprise." 218 The Outer Space
Treaty promotes outer space peace and thus encourages private
activity in outer space.
Another direct international effect upon corporations is the pro-
tection corporations receive under the Rescue and Return Agree-
ment. Should a space vehicle operated by a corporation
experience distress while in outer space, or have an accident on
Earth, the personnel of that vehicle will receive assistance from a
state which has joined in the Agreement.2 19 Considering the
physical dangers inherent in space activities and the technologi-
cal resources that would be required to undertake a rescue effort,
this is an important benefit for a corporation and its personnel
working in outer space.
2. Corporations and the United States.
One of the basic principles of space law is that states are inter-
nationally responsible for all national, governmental, and non-
governmental activities in outer space.220 The steps which the
United States has taken, and in some instances has not taken, to
implement its responsibility have a direct effect on United States
corporations seeking to become commercially active in outer
space.22 1
International space law directly affects American corporations
in two ways. First, the treaties entered into by the United States
are a part of the positive law of this country.222 Second, the space
programs that the government undertakes through NASA are
218. Finch, Law and Security in Outer Space: Implications for Private Enter-
prise, 11 J. SPACE L. 107, 107 (1983). Peace in outer space also has an indirect ef-
fect which is discussed infra in text accompanying note 242.
219. See Impact of Treaties, supra note 1, at 398; STS, supra note 1, at 638. For a
discussion of the Rescue and Return Agreement, see supra text accompanying
notes 66-76.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
221. See Hoover, supra note 107, at 117-18; Reijnen, supra note 217, at 69.
222. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... and all Treaties
made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI. See
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). See generally Regulation, supra
note 9, at 163-66 for discussion of self-executing or non self-executing nature of the
space treaties.
designed to comply with international law.2 23 Corporations which
participate in NASA's programs are compelled to comply with in-
ternational law as well. 224
The United States has imposed its greatest restrictions upon
corporate space activities in the area of third-party liability for
damage caused by space objects or their component parts. The
emphasis on this point is a direct result of the international liabil-
ity imposed upon the United States by the Outer Space Treaty
and the Liability Convention.225 By means of a launch agreement,
NASA shifts this liability to the corporation. 226
The launch agreement requires the corporation, referred to as
the user, to purchase insurance which indemnifies the govern-
ment against third-party claims. 227 In the past, users have
purchased up to $300 million in liability insurance policies for a
premium of approximately $50,000 a launch. 228
223. When NASA was created, Congress declared the policy of the United
States to be "that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for
the benefit of all mankind." 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (1976). One of the stated objec-
tives for the United States' involvement with space activities is "[c] ooperation by
the United States with other nations." Id. § 2451 (c) (7). See Diederiks-Verschoor,
supra note 47, at 45-46.
224. It is the policy of the United States to "encourage domestic commercial ex-
ploitation of space capabilities and systems for economic benefit." United States
Presidential Decision Memorandum 37, White House Press Release, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1135, 1136 (June 20, 1978). See supra note 20. As a result, NASA
seeks to involve the private sector in its programs, especially with regard to the
Space Shuttle. The need for government regulation to ensure compliance with in-
ternational law must coexist with the need to attract corporations. The resultant
tensions are most noticeable in the area of liability insurance discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 225-32. See generally Regulation, supra note 9, at 187-88
(proposed space policy designed to encourage corporations through minimal regu-
lations while still complying with international law).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 86-109.
226. For a sample Launch Agreement, see 1 UNITED STATES SPACE LAw, supra
note 29, I.A.7. In situations where a corporation has not used NASA to launch its
space objects, the government would be able to implead the corporation should a
claim under the Liability Convention be made against the United States. Regula-
tion, supra note 9, at 168.
227. In the case of the Space Shuttle, the terms of the Launch Agreement also
require that all parties on the same flight agree not to hold each other liable for
any damage caused by another party's payload or personnel. Each user is respon-
sible for insuring himself. In addition, the Launch Agreement frees NASA from
any liability for damages caused by delay, nonperformance, or improper perform-
ance of its services. See DeSaussure, supra note 80, at 2; Wolcott, Some Aspects of
Third Party Liability in Space Shuttle Operations, 13 AKRON L. REV. 613, 615-16
(1980).
228. Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle,
in SPACE SHUTrLE AND THE LAW 111, 112 (S. Gorove ed. 1980). As a result of the
recent losses of satellites launched from the Space Shuttle, some underwriters
and brokers of satellite insurance predict that premiums will increase considera-
bly. The loss to insurers from the failure of Westar 6 and Palapa-B2 is estimated
at between $190 million and $200 million. L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1984, Part I, at 9, col.
1. On the subject of insurance available to corporations engaged in space activi-
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In 1980, section 308 dealing with insurance and indemnification
was added to the NASAct.229 This statute gives NASA the author-
ity to provide liability insurance for users, and to indemnify the
user for third-party claims in excess of the liability insurance. 230
The cost of insurance will be reimbursed by the users to the max-
imum extent practicable. 23 1 This, type of authority helps NASA
solve the problem raised earlier of encouraging corporations
while also complying with international law. Under this arrange-
ment, the user is able to purchase enough insurance to cover
most foreseeable risks and is indemnified for any damages his in-
surance does not cover. This allows the corporation to pay a
smaller premium. At the same time, the United States is indem-
nified in the majority of cases and only has to pay damages in the
event of some wholly unforeseeable accident. 232
Space law has an additional effect on corporations' space activi-
ties through the grant of jurisdiction to the United States over
space objects and their personnel. This jurisdiction provides the
ties, see generally Hosenball, The Space Shuttle in Perspective: Commercial As-
pects, in SPACE SHUTrLE AND THE LAW 117, 122-23 (S. Gorove ed. 1980); Margo,
Some Aspects of Insuring Satellites, 1979 INs. L.J. 555 (1979); Space Commerce,
supra note 18, at 84 (summary of paper delivered by James W. Barrett).
229, Section 308 in the original statute has been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2458b
and provides as follows:
(a) The Administration is authorized on such terms and to the extent it
may deem appropriate to provide liability insurance for any user of a
space vehicle to compensate all or a portion of claims by third parties for
death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property resulting from activi-
ties carried on in connection with the launch, operations or recovery of
the space vehicle. Appropriations available to the Administration may be
used to acquire such insurance, but such appropriations shall be reim-
bursed to the maximum extent practicable by the users under reimburse-
ment policies established pursuant to section 2473(c) of this title.
(b) Under such regulations in conformity with this section as the Admin-
istrator shall prescribe taking into account the availability, cost and terms
of liability insurance, any agreement between the Administration and a
user of a space vehicle may provide that the United States will indemnify
the user against claims (including reasonable expenses of litigation or set-
tlement) by third parties for death, bodily injury, or loss of or damage to
property resulting from activities carried on in connection with the
launch, operations or recovery of the space vehicle, but only to the extent
that such claims are not compensated by liability insurance of the user.
Provided, That such indemnification may be limited to claims resulting
from other than the actual negligence or willful misconduct of the user.
42 U.S.C. § 2458b (a)-(b) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis in original).
230. Id. at § 2458b(b).
231. Id. at § 2458b(a).
232. See Mossinghoff, supra note 228, at 111 (discussion of section 308 and its
importance).
United States with broad powers to regulate corporate activities
in space.2 33 This authority is necessary in order for the United
States to comply with its obligation to authorize and supervise
the activities of its citizens in space. 234 However, the United
States has not yet exercised its jurisdiction in outer space.
Neither the federal government's criminal jurisdiction nor civil ju-
risdiction has been extended to outer space.235 This nonexercise
of jurisdiction is understandable given the nature of the United
States' space efforts to date. As corporations become more active
in space, however, the United States will be forced to extend its
jurisdiction to fulfill its legal obligations.
The United States' concern for carrying out its international re-
sponsibilities, and the direct effect this has upon corporations, is
evident in several provisions of the Launch Agreement. These
provisions require that certain information be supplied to NASA
by corporations. 236 Although the corporation may retain the
rights to any data it collects in space, or the patents on any inven-
tions, it must supply NASA with enough information to verify
that the activity has a peaceful purpose and that NASA and the
federal government are complying with all laws and obliga-
tions. 237 When corporate activity affects the public health, safety,
or welfare, the government might require the corporation to make
the results of its activities available to the public under reason-
able terms and conditions. 238 Through these devices, the govern-
ment may ensure that the corporations are complying with
233. See Menter, supra note 140, at 229-31; Regulation, supra note 9, at 175;
supra text accompanying notes 110-21.
234. If the United States did not have jurisdiction over its space objects and
their personnel, there would be no means for the United States to exert control
over the actions of the personnel or the space objects. They would be beyond the
reach of United States law.
235. See Gorove, supra note 50, at 6 (no criminal jurisdiction); Regulation,
supra note 9, at 183 ("No specific legislation presently exists by which independ-
ent private aerospace activities can be brought into conformity with national
objectives"); STS, supra note 1, at 637-38 (no civil jurisdiction).
There are two exceptions to this situation. First, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice extends to military personnel regardless of their location. 10 U.S.C. § 810
(1982). Since the vast majority of astronauts have been in the military, there has
been some criminal jurisdiction in the past. The second exception is the absolute
authority given to the commander of the Space Shuttle to enforce order and disci-
pline and to take whatever action he deems necessary "for the protection, safety,
and well-being of all personnel and on-board equipment, including the STS ele-
ments and payloads." 14 C.F.R. § 1214.7 (1983). See STS, supra note 1, at 636-37.
236. See supra note 226.
237. See 14 C.F.R. § 1214.104(a)-(b) (1983); Menter, supra note 1, at 390-91; Mos-
singhof, Intellectual Property Rights in Space Ventures, 10 J. SPACE L. 107, 108
(1983).
238. See Mossinghoff, supra note 237, at 108; 14 C.F.R. § 1214.104(a) (1983).
Under any other circumstances, however, NASA seeks not to receive any trade
secrets. Id. at 110-11.
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international law and that the benefits of the corporations' activi-
ties will be shared with the world.
A final effect of international law on private activity results
from the Registration Convention.239 When corporations begin
launching their own space objects they will be required to regis-
ter them with the State Department. The State Department is the
government's agency in charge of the United States' registry of
space objects. 24 0 A registration requirement will be necessary if
the United States is to comply with the Registration Convention.
B. Indirect Effects on Private Activity
The greatest negative effect of international space law is the un-
certainty of the principles contained in the space treaties. 24 1 A
determinative factor in a corporate decision to undertake a com-
mercial space venture will be to what extent the corporation be-
lieves international space law provides "freedom from danger,
fear, anxiety and deprivation relating to its right to conduct busi-
ness, its equipment, its employees, its technology, and its
profits."242
A variety of issues may cause corporations to seriously ques-
tion the feasibility of commercial space activities. The expanding
role of the military in space creates doubt concerning continued
peaceful international cooperation in space.243 The increased mil-
itary space activity also causes a transfer of funds from civil pro-
grams to military programs.24 4 Coupled with this concern is the
expectation that any loss that occurs will generate long and com-
plex litigation.245 Another unsettled area concerns how much pro-
tection corporations will enjoy from interference by other
states. 24 6 There is no adequate relief granted to corporations
239. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
240. See Regulation, supra note 9, at 173-74; Reijnen, supra note 217, at 71-72.
241. The fears are most evident in the debate over the Moon Treaty. See supra
text accompanying notes 135-63.
242. Hoover, supra note 107, at 115.
243. Reaves, Commerce in Sky, 69 A.B.A. J. 1371, 1371 (1983) ("Weapons in
space greatly increase the risk to private sector investment") (quoting Rep.
George Brown).
244. Id. If the United States diverts funds to military space activities, NASA
must operate on a smaller budget. Since corporations currently depend on NASA
for launchings, any decrease in NASA's capabilities impacts on corporate space
activities.
245. See Hoover, supra note 107, at 119; supra note 107.
246. See Management, supra note 9, at 102-03. Interference with a corporation's
which experience interference with their activities, even though
the Outer Space Treaty sets forth guidelines. 247
The United States' response to its international space law obli-
gations may create uncertainty regarding a commercial project's
eventual success. If the United States does not make its positions
clear, or overregulates space activities, corporations may be un-
likely to undertake the development of space programs.24 8
The last area of major concern to private industry is the future
of space law. Uncertainty over the direction international space
law will take indirectly affects the decision of the type of space ac-
tivities to promote.249 Thus, uncertainty is most evident with re-
gard to the Moon Treaty. The main concerns respecting the Moon
Treaty are what form an international regime will take, and the
percentage of the benefits from space activities corporations
would be allowed to retain.250 Even though the Moon Treaty may
never receive the approval necessary to be effective, it still dem-
onstrates the philosophy of many of the members of COPUOS.
Future space treaties are likely to represent some of these views,
which may be detrimental to the interests of private enterprise.
The indirect effect upon private space activity that results from
uncertainty is great.
With the knowledge that rules will be established in the future to govern
such [space] activity and without any guidelines to allow an economic
space activities could take many forms. There might be direct military acts taken
during war or there could be indirect side effects of peaceful activities. For exam-
ple, disruption of radio frequencies in the region of a corporation's space manufac-
turing plant could have serious consequences, especially if the plant depends on
data from Earth for its operation.
247. See Hoover, supra note 107, at 120-21; supra text accompanying notes 122-
32.
248. See Reaves, supra note 243, at 1371-72.
It is impossible for the private sector in America to establish a meaningful
presence in space without a strong civil space program. The one thing
that could stop us from developing space would be harsh regulation. Free
enterprise does not move where there is no possibility of profit.
Id. at 1372 (quoting Arthur Dula).
249. If the uncertainty surrounding the Moon Treaty continues, corporations
will not be able to go ahead with lunar activities. No corporation will devote large
amounts of time and money to undertake a pilot project only to have a morato-
rium placed upon lunar exploitation. See supra text accompanying notes 146-55.
Whether this fear is valid or not is irrelevant; if fear exists it discourages private
enterprise. The same concerns may arise in the context of remote sensing, use of
nuclear power sources, and the definition/delimitation question. If corporations
cannot predict where the law is going, any investment in space activity would be
unlikely. The delay caused by this uncertainty postpones the day when mankind
will fully benefit from space and its resources. See infra text accompanying note
250.
250. See Dula, supra note 80, at 14-17; Hoover, supra note 107, at 121-24; supra
text accompanying notes 135-63. The debate over defining and/or delimiting space
also concerns private industry. See Gorove, supra note 28, at 205-06 (quoting
Daniel Cassidy).
[Vol. 11: 521, 1984] International Law of Outer Space
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
evaluation of the potential return on such activities, investment sources
may hesitate or refuse to provide the financing necessary to support the
entry into and continuance in outer space activities by private
industry.
2 5 1
V. CONCLUSION
The nations of the world have responded to the potential of
space by creating the international law of outer space. The Outer
Space Treaty and its progeny were drafted in the hope that space
will be saved from the conflicts and abuses that plague man's ac-
tivities on Earth.
Corporations in the United States stand in a unique position to
reap the benefits of the law of outer space. Space law has guaran-
teed the right to use and exploit outer space, and has provided
answers to many legal questions that surround the use of space.
Out of this legal framework comes an atmosphere which encour-
ages future space activities.
The framework of space law also creates certain obligations for
those who would utilize outer space. Chief among these obliga-
tions is the requirement that all space activities be carried out for
the benefit of humanity. Although the resources of outer space
belong to all, only a select few have the capability to exploit them.
As a result, American private enterprise must act as a trustee for
the world. Corporations may undertake space ventures with an
expectation of retaining some of the profits to reward their efforts,
but a portion of the proceeds and benefits must be made available
to the world community. Sharing the benefits of outer space does
not mean simply "cutting up the pie" so that each country re-
ceives a slice. Instead, the proceeds of space are to be used to in-
crease the quality of life on Earth and not solely to increase the
gross profits of major corporations.
It is vitally important that corporations understand the law of
outer space and its basic principles. Not only will space law affect
the ways in which corporations utilize space and its resources,
but it will also hold the key whereby those resources may be fully
exploited. A unique opportunity awaits, and a unique body of law
exists to ensure that the opportunity becomes a reality.
JAMES J. TRIMBLE
251. Hoover, supra note 107, at 122.

